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I. INTRODUCTION
Management has rediscovered workplace cooperative ef-
forts.' The National Labor Relations Board ("Board" or
1. Although no reliable census of the number of workplace coopera-
tive efforts exists, several recent surveys estimate the current levels of
activity. For example, a 1991 survey of 694 firms with fifty or more
employees found that sixty-four percent of the surveyed establishments
have one or more employee involvement activities in place. See Paul
Osterman, How Common Is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts
It?, 47 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 173, 177 (1994). The Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations, created by President Clinton,
found that a substantial majority of the larger American employers re-
ported using some form of workplace cooperative efforts. See Fact Finding
Report: Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, XI
U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, at 36 (May 1994) [hereinafter Fact Finding Re-
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"NLRB"),2 Congress,3 and President Clinton4 and his Republi-
can challenger, Senator Dole,5 have also rediscovered this phe-
nomenon. Workplace cooperative efforts, however, are hardly
new to the American workplace or the American legal system.
For almost a century, management has experimented with
various forms of cooperative approaches to work organization.
These programs, typically involving a small group of employees
who meet on a fairly regular basis to identify workplace prob-
lems and opportunities for improvement, have been imple-
port].
In this Article, the terms "participatory programs" and "workplace
cooperative efforts" are used to refer to any program in which employer
and employees participate outside the traditional collective bargaining
structure. Several such efforts are discussed below.
2. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35
F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing whether an "action committee"
consisting of six employees and one or two managers qualifies as a labor
organization); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993)
(discussing examples of lawful and unlawful workplace cooperative ef-
forts).
3. Both houses of congress approved legislation addressing workplace
cooperative efforts last year. The Employees and Managers Act, H.R. 743,
104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter TEAM Act] passed by a margin of 221 to
202.
4. As he had promised the year before, President Clinton vetoed the
TEAM Act, arguing that the current law poses no threat to workplace
cooperative efforts. See Employee Participation: Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act
Despite Pleas From Business For Passage, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
147, at d4 (July 31, 1996); see also Labor-Management Cooperation: GOP
Bid To Expand Employee Involvement Brings Protests From Organized
Labor, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 72, at d29 (Apr. 14, 1995) (noting
that Vice President Gore told union leaders in February, 1995 that Presi-
dent Clinton was prepared to veto the bill). Several Republican legislators
and management groups have vowed to pursue similar legislation in
1997. See Employee Participation: Kassebaum Hits Clinton's TEAM Act
Veto As Election-Year Move To Placate Labor, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) 148, at d8 (Aug. 1, 1996).
5. In his last days as Senate majority leader, Senator Dole attached
the TEAM proposal to a legislative package that included a minimum
wage increase and the elimination of a recently enacted federal gasoline
tax. He was obliged to rescind the package, however, after failing to gain
the necessary votes. See Employee Participation: Issue of Representation
Is Addressed in Possible Amendment to TEAM Act, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) 100, at d6 (May 23, 1996).
1997] 325
HeinOnline  -- 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 325 1996-1997
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
mented in a variety of forms. They have been referred to as,
inter alia, "Quality Circles," "Teams," and "Employee Involve-
ment Groups.
'
Since their inception, the legality, efficiency and even moral-
ity of such programs have been the subject of ongoing debate.'
Following the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or "Act")8 in 1937, the debate has centered on the
question of whether section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA prohibits em-
ployers from implementing cooperative efforts in the
workplace.9 Section 8(a)(2) prohibits an employer from domi-
nating or interfering with the formation or administration of a
labor organization.' ° Employers have traditionally argued
that any restrictions on their ability to establish workplace
cooperative efforts reduce managerial flexibility and firm pro-
ductivity thus leaving American firms at an economic disad-
vantage in an increasingly competitive global economy." Con-
versely, labor organizations and employees have been con-
cerned that employers "misuse" such cooperative approaches as
anti-union and control mechanisms.12
This decades-long debate has reached a crucial juncture.
Employers have been outraged by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board's recent decisions striking down the validity of
participatory programs and have turned to Congress for re-
lief.1 3 In response, Congress approved legislation seeking to
6. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
7. See generally GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS: QUALI-
TY CIRCLES AND ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 16-22, 176-84
(1988) (discussing various aspects of implementing workplace cooperative
efforts).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
9. See infra notes 86-143 and accompanying text.
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
11. See Statements on the TEAM Act Before the House Economic and
Educational Opportunities Committee, May 11, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) 92, at d31 (May 12, 1995). Bill Gooding (R-PA), Chairman of the
Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities, argued that for a
company to compete in an increasingly competitive and information-driven
economy, employees must understand and participate in the entire busi-
ness organization.
12. See Factfinding Report, supra note 1, at 32-34.
13. See Employee Participation; TEAM Act Supporters Launch Cam-
paign to Push for Passage, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 26, at d15 (Feb.
[Vol.49:323326
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amend the NLRA to facilitate the use of such programs. 4 Or-
ganized labor, however, successfully lobbied the Clinton admin-
istration to veto the legislation.15
This Article analyzes employee participatory programs from
the internal labor markets perspective. 6 Internal Labor Mar-
kets ("ILM") refer to the explicit or implicit agreements be-
tween employer and employees incorporating rules governing
wages, working hours, promotion opportunities and grievance
procedures. In order to function properly, ILMs require em-
ployees to learn skills that are valuable to the contracting firm,
but are of much lesser value elsewhere. Employees agree to ac-
quire such "firm-specific" skills and employers agree to subsi-
dize the training needed to obtain these new skills. It is a
mutually beneficial arrangement: employers expect to observe
increases in productivity and efficiency and employees expect
increases in pay and employment security as their tenure with
the firm increases. These implicit or explicit agreements, how-
ever, may not be realized. A countervailing characteristic of
ILMs is that once established, both parties might have strong
incentives to refuse to perform, that is, to engage in opportu-
nistic behavior. Examining ways to prevent such behavior is
the central theme of this Article.
Application of the ILM analysis to participatory programs
provides us with some useful insights. 7 First, implementing
workplace cooperative programs requires employees to learn
new skills which, although very valuable to the current em-
ployer, may have little value outside the current firm. Second,
like most ILM arrangements, the idiosyncratic nature of firm-
8 1996) (describing the kickoff of an information campaign by several
major U.S. corporations and headed by two former congressmen to gain
public support for the bill); Employee Participation: Business Leaders
Urge Clinton to Sign Teamwork Legislation, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
122, at d6 (June 25, 1996) (noting that over 600 top corporate executives
signed a letter to President Clinton urging him to sign the bill should it
reach his desk).
14. See infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
15. See Employee Participation: Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite
Pleas From Business for Passage, supra note 4, at d4 (reporting that
President Clinton vetoed the TEAM Act on July 30, 1996).
16. See infra notes 268-92 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 293-336 and accompanying text.
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 327 1996-1997
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
specific skills creates incentives for opportunistic behavior.
Employees can reduce their job effort and employers can imple-
ment policies making it difficult for employees to recover the
benefit of their human capital investments. Controlling such
opportunistic behavior at later stages of the employment rela-
tionship should be the guiding concern when the Board and
reviewing courts apply section 8(a)(2) to determine the legality
of cooperative efforts.
The NLRB's interpretation of section 8(a)(2), however, has
been inconsistent at times and demonstrates a tendency to
focus on tangential issues rather than the problems identified
by the ILM analysis." For example, the Board has largely
focused on the issue of freedom of choice, asking whether em-
ployees have been tricked into believing that a new cooperative
effort is in fact an independent bargaining representative
which will protect their interests against the employer. Al-
though freedom of choice problems are certainly significant,
they are not an ILM problem. When judging the legality of
cooperative efforts, the Board and the courts should not focus
on the participatory program's immediate impact on the orga-
nizing drive, but rather on the effect the participatory program
could have on the long-term employment relationship. The
central inquiry should be whether the employer's program will
increase the likelihood of opportunistic behavior at later stages
of the employment process. The Board, when interpreting sec-
tion 8(a)(2), should shift its focus to incorporate an ILM. By
dispensing with peripheral considerations, a more coherent
and stronger section 8(a)(2) test may be formulated, which can
potentially resolve the debate over workplace cooperative ef-
forts.
Part I of this Article describes the various forms of
workplace cooperative efforts. Part II introduces some of the
programs currently used by employers which are subject to
section 8(a)(2) scrutiny. Additionally, Part II identifies the
skills learned by employees involved in participatory programs
which suggest the ILM characteristics of these programs. Part
III discusses the existing views on the legality of workplace
cooperative efforts and then analyzes those policies proposed to
18. See infra notes 144-223 and accompanying text.
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resolve the workplace cooperative efforts dispute. Part IV in-
troduces the internal labor market framework, while Parts V
and VI apply this framework to the workplace cooperative
efforts problem. Finally, Part VII presents some concluding
remarks.
II. WORKPLACE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
Workplace cooperative efforts have received extensive treat-
ment in both legal and management literature. 9 Although the
19. The management and human resources literature have addressed a
range of topics. See generally Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Un-
ions and Contemporary Innovations in Work Organization, Compensation,
and Employee Participation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS
173, 180-93 (Lawrence Nishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992) (describing the
role of unions in the development and performance of workplace coop-
erative efforts); Walter J. Gershenfeld, Employee Participation in Firm
Decisions, in HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FIRM
123 (Morris M. Kleiner et al. eds., 1978) (reviewing recent empirical
studies analyzing the effect of workplace cooperative efforts on firm per-
formance); Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett Harrison, Unions, Technology,
and Labor-Management Cooperation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETI-
TIVENESS supra, at 247-86 (analyzing the effects of the implementation of
workplace cooperative efforts in the performance of the firm).
Similarly, the legal literature in this area has been comprehensive.
See generally A.B. Cochran III, We Participate, They Decide: The Real
Stakes in Revising Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 16
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 458 (1995) (arguing against legislative
amendment of Section 8(a)(2)); Dennis M. Devaney, Much Ado About
Section 8(a)(2): The NLRB and Workplace Cooperation After Electromation
and du Pont, 23 STETSON L. REV. 39 (1993) (arguing that contrary to
conventional wisdom, the NLRB decisions in Electromation and E.I. du
Pont do not signal the end of employee participation programs); Karl E.
Mare, The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democra-
cy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39 (1988) (providing a third
alternative to the adversarial and cooperation models); Michael H. LeRoy,
Can TEAM Work? Implication of an [Electromation] and [dul [Pont] Com-
pliance Analysis for the TEAM Act, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 215 (1996)
(providing an empirical analysis of private sector compliance with the
NLRB's guidelines concerning workplace cooperative efforts); Note, Collec-
tive Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial
Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1662 (1983) [hereinafter Harvard Note] (arguing that the central
concern of section 8(a)(2) is to ensure that labor relations are conducted
through institutions that are sufficiently autonomous as bargaining repre-
1997] 329
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analysis conduced thus far has been otherwise comprehensive,
little attention has been paid to the internal labor markets
characteristics of these programs. This section begins by trac-
ing the historical development of workplace cooperative efforts
in the United States and then considers two predominant
types of cooperative efforts and attempts to identify their ILM
characteristics.
A. A Brief History of Workplace Cooperative Efforts
Cooperative efforts, both in concept and practice, date back
as far as the end of the last century. "Company unions,"' as
they were known, were attractive to employers for a variety of
reasons. Some progressive employers were concerned about the
dehumanizing effects which the large corporation, the mass
production system and managerial control techniques were
having on the workforce.21 Other employers, however, saw
company unions as a means of thwarting the formation of
independent unions.22 Due to the range of motives behind
their formation, no single type of company union emerged as
the rule. Several employers adopted a broad approach. They
introduced extensive employee welfare programs, including
various forms of insurance and social services (such as banks
and libraries), and gave employees some control over major
working conditions subject to the employer's veto right.23 Oth-
sentative); Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1736 (1985)
[hereinafter Michigan Note] (arguing that workplace cooperative programs
initiated by the employer in nonunion settings should be permissible
under the NLRA when they do not restrict the freedom of employees to
choose their own bargaining representatives); Note, Rethinking the Ad-
versarial Model In Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section
8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021 (1987) [hereinafter Yale Note] (contrasting the
adversarial and cooperative models).
20. See Daniel Nelson, Employee Representation in Historical Perspec-
tive, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIREC-
TIONS 371, 372 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (dis-
cussing the origins of company unions); see also LeRoy, supra note 19, at
222 (discussing The Filene Cooperative and other U.S. Corporations that
gave workers the right to govern their working conditions).
21. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 372.
22. See id.
23. See id.; see also LeRoy, supra note 19, at 222 (noting that the
330 [Vol.49:323
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er employers embraced a more guarded form of company un-
ion."' These were mainly used as a representative and bar-
gaining entity of fairly modest scope.' During the 1920s and
early 1930s, companies in the railroad, textile, and garment
industries began to expand from the company union type of
participatory program to programs similar in form to contem-
porary quality circles and top-level planning committees.26
The 1920s also saw the development of the Hawthorne experi-
ments, emphasizing the use of democratic leadership and im-
proved communication.27 It should be stressed, therefore, that
company unions, as well as the other participatory experi-
ments of the early 1900s, were motivated by a wide variety of
concerns. These included improving efficiency, reducing labor
turnover, controlling abusive supervisory behavior, increasing
employees' loyalty and commitment to the firm and
yes-avoiding unionism.' It was such a mixture of objectives
and policies that generated within organized labor a tradition
of suspicion and hostility toward the implementation and use
of workplace cooperative efforts.'
Labor's fears did not take long to materialize. During the
following decade, with the passage of the 1933 National Indus-
trial Recovery Act,3" the focus of participatory programs
turned from employee involvement to union-avoidance.31 The
shift from a welfare-oriented to an anti-union focus is histori-
cally significant as the latter prompted the NLRA.32 Thus, the
Filene Cooperative allowed workers to govern their working conditions
subject to the owner's right to veto).
24. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 373.
25. See id.
26. See Gershenfeld, supra note 19, at 126.
27. See id. The findings of the Hawthorne experiments, conducted at
Western Electric, suggested that employees who were consulted about
their work were more interested in what they were doing and were also
more effective. See id.
28. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Current Prospects for Employee Representa-
tion in the US.: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 16 J. LAB. RES. 387, 393-94
(1995).
29. See Gershenfeld, supra note 19, at 126.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1933), repealed by A.L.A. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
31. See Jacoby, supra note 28, at 393.
32. See Cochran, supra note 19, at 473-75 (asserting that section
1997] 331
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major concern of section 8(a)(2) was the elimination of the
inside union option as a means of structuring labor-manage-
ment relationships.'
The Second World War, however, brought another round of
employee involvement experimentation.34 During the follow-
ing three decades an explosion of research in the behavioral
sciences expanded the contours of cooperative efforts." Com-
mon research topics included goal setting, team-building, and
the characteristics that differentiated successful organizations
from their less successful counterparts." This renewed aca-
demic interest in participatory programs generated some ex-
perimentation with new programs, especially in the unionized
sector of the economy.37 For example, the soon notorious "area
labor-management committees," were instituted in the early
1970s with the support of the National Commission on Produc-
tivity.' The committees brought together labor and manage-
ment in geographical areas facing economic difficulties. 9 They
attempted to improve through cooperative efforts both the eco-
nomic state of their communities and the state of labor-man-
agement relationships."
Despite the intellectual interest sparked by the concept of
employee involvement and the success of various workplace
experiments, it was not until the 1980s that participatory
programs had a real impact at the industry level. 1 By the
mid-1980s surveys indicated that experimentation with partici-
8(a)(2) prohibited interfering with labor organizations).
33. See id.
34. See Gershenfeld, supra note 19, at 126 (discussing formation of
labor-management committees to aid work effort and the lasting effects
in some industries).






41. See Ted Mills, Europe's Industrial Democracy: An American Re-
sponse, 56 HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 143, 147-48 (observing
that the United States, unlike most European countries during the 1970s,
experienced no trend toward "industrial democracy," despite its strong
labor organizations).
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patory programs was widespread among U.S. firms.42 Judging
from the intensity of the debate over recent NLRB decisions
concerning the legality of such programs, interest remains
strong in the 1990s.
B. What are Workplace Cooperative Efforts?
Workplace cooperative programs come in many forms.43
Aimed at involving employees in decision-making activities,
such programs generally organize those employees into a team
or group." Typically, both salaried and hourly employees
come together to share ideas concerning quality improvements,
waste reduction, and to identify and solve problems."
Cooperative efforts have normally been classified along the
following lines: employee participatory programs (quality cir-
cles, quality of work life, and strategic participation), teams,
and gainsharing, profit-sharing or employee stock ownership
plans." The legality of the latter three programs has not been
challenged under section 8(a)(2).4" Thus, this Article's analysis
42. See Gershenfeld, supra note 19, at 129-32 (asserting that employee
involvement programs and quality of life programs were in effect at 53%
of the firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange in a 1982 survey).
43. See Eaton & Voos, supra note 19, at 176-78 (providing a descrip-
tion of selected programs, their characteristics and their effectiveness).
44. See id.
45. See WILLIAM N. COOKE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION: NEW
PARTNERSHIPS OR GOING IN CIRCLES? 3 (1990) (describing the structure
and purpose of most labor and management joint committees).
46. See Eaton & Voos, supra note 19, at 176; see also, Samuel
Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the 'Company Union' Prohibition:
The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 125, 127 (1994) (dividing cooperative efforts into those that are
concerned with immediate supervisory and management issues ("online"
systems) and those concerned with issues of a more general nature, such
as plant-wide procedures, policies and developments). As this Article
seeks to identify the ILMs aspects of cooperative efforts and because both
on-line and off-line systems involve ILM type issues, I use the more
conventional classification. Even the conventional classification is some-
what artificial, because most workplace cooperative efforts tend to evolve
and change over time in ways that defy any sort of classification scheme.
See Fact Finding Report, supra note 1, at 37 (investigating the different
and evolving cooperative approaches used by large and small companies
in various industries).
47. See Comment, The Saturnization of American Plants: Infringement
19971 333
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focuses on the former two-those that have caused the most
controversy.
1. Employee Participatory and Involvement Programs
Employee Participatory and Involvement Programs
("EPIPs") is the general term applied to programs designed to
involve employees in firm decisionmaking.4 EPIPs will most
likely involve small group meetings engineered toward moti-
vating employees to share suggestions for improving productiv-
ity. 9 EPIPs include quality circles, quality of worklife efforts
and strategic participation programs." These variants differ
mainly in the nature of the issues that fall under the group's
jurisdiction. 1 They are similar in terms of structure and the
process involved in their formation and implementation. 2
This Article's focus is on the internal labor market dimensions
of these programs, thus discussion will concentrate on the
structure and process of quality circles.
Quality circles are best defined as a "formal, institutional-
ized mechanism for productive and participative problem-solv-
ing interaction among employees."53 Typically, quality circles
involve small groups of employees from the same depart-
or Expansion of Workers' Rights?, 72 MINN. L. REv. 173, 189-94 (1987)
(discussing how the federal government has encouraged the creation of
such programs).
48. See Eaton & Voos, supra note 19, at 176.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. OUCHI, THEORY Z: How AMERICAN BUSINESS
CAN MEET THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE 261-68 (1981) (describing Japanese
companies' success with Quality Control Circles); see also Michigan Note,
supra note 19, at 1738-41.
51. Quality Circles usually focus on productivity and efficiency issues.
OUCHI, supra note 50, at 261, while Quality of Worklife programs tend to
address the more general aspects of employees' well being. Michigan
Note, supra note 19, at 1738. Strategic Participation Programs concen-
trate on higher level decisions on questions of company policy and future
guiding strategic principles, e.g., decisions concerning capital involvement,
technology and product design. See Eaton & Voos, supra note 19, at 176.
52. See COOKE, supra note 45, at 4 (emphasizing that the "structural
similarities do not imply that there are no differences among team-based
programs").
53. OLGA L. CROCKER ET AL., QUALITY CIRCLES: A GUIDE TO PARTICI-
PATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 6 (1984).
334 [Vol.49:323
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ment.54 The groups convene periodically for purposes of exam-
ining productivity and quality issues, engaging in a continuing
effort to uncover and solve work-related problems, monitoring
and assessing new opportunities, and suggesting ways to capi-
talize on those developments.55 Members of quality circles
may also meet to learn both interpersonal and technical prob-
lem-solving skills.
Quality circles may or may not be structured to include
managerial employees.56 The average quality circle involves
about eight to ten employees.57 Meetings can be scheduled
both during scheduled work hours with managerial approval,
or after working hours on the employees' own initiative."
Meetings are chaired by a leader, who acts as a facilitator to
encourage participation and keep the participants focused on
the predetermined agenda. The group leader may be either a
front-line supervisor or a paid facilitator.59 An essential ele-
ment of quality circles is the involvement of employees in
group objectives beyond the span of each meeting. Thus, mem-
bers frequently receive assignments, such as observing the
day-to-day activities at the plant or collecting and analyzing
data, and report their findings at the following meeting. °
Typically, employee-members of quality circles do not receive
additional compensation for participation and there are no
immediate rewards for making good suggestions.6'
The internal workings of a typical quality circle are a fairly
complex process. The implementation of a quality circle in-
volves multiple stages which include brainstorming sessions,
selecting a problem, identifying causes and subcauses, consul-
54. See id. at 7.
55. See id.; see also Michigan Note, supra note 19, at 1740 (explaining
how the Japanese Quality Control Circle differs from quality of worklife
projects).





61. See GREGORY B. NoRTHCRAFT & MARGARET A. NEALE, ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAVIOR: A MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE 506 (1990) (examining
Quality Circles as a management technique for improving employee per-
formance).
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tation with other groups or departments affected by the prob-
lem, and training in technical and statistical analysis to solve
the problem. 2 These stages are expected to take place during
a time span of eight to twelve weeks, with most stages requir-
ing activities of varying complexity. 63
2. Teams
"Teams," like EPIPs, are participatory programs character-
ized by intense involvement in a potentially large number of
issues.4 A "team" has been defined as "a small number of
people with complementary skills who are committed to a
common purpose, performance goals, and approach for which
they hold themselves mutually accountable."6'5 This definition
includes two elements which highlight the internal labor mar-
ket aspects of cooperative efforts.
First, being committed to a "common purpose and perfor-
mance goal" requires members of the team to spend a substan-
tial amount of time and effort exploring, shaping and agreeing
on a purpose that is both collective and individual.6 They
must also define the standards against which their perfor-
62. See CROCKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 87-92 (identifying the fol-
lowing five stages in the Quality Circle process: 1) preliminary activities:
initial meeting; circle goals and objectives established; brainstorming for
problems to be solved; and discussion of problem suggestions; 2) selection
of a critical problem; 3) identification of subcauses perceived to be most
crucial to problem elimination; assignment of activities to individual
members for purpose of verifying subcauses; presentation to circle of
verification; and selection of subcauses shown to be most crucial to prob-
lem elimination; 4) brainstorming for solutions: development of action
plans to assist in analyses of solution; assignment of activities to individ-
ual members for purposes of investigating and verifying solutions; selec-
tion of best solutions; decide on adequate solution; and communicate
findings to members of technical and managerial staff; 5) implementation
Process: prepare report; oral presentation; and implement solution).
63. See id. at 87-96.
64. See Eaton & Voos, supra note 19, at 177; see also Michigan Note,
supra note 19, at 1741 (providing insight into the use of employee pro-
duction teams as a participating management technique).
65. See JON R. KATZENBACH & DOUGLAS K. SMITH, THE WISDOM OF
TEAMS 45 (1993) (developing this definition of teams from other goal-
oriented groups).
66. See id. at 50.
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mance as a group will be measured."7 Finding a common set
of standards requires team members to engage in activities
particular to their firms. The activities or skills are associated
with internal labor markets: getting to know other employees;
learning jobs of other team members; and assuming team re-
sponsibility for decisions that were formerly the responsibility
of particular individuals. 8
Second, the operation of a team requires that there be a
commitment to a "common approach." This part of the defini-
tion relates directly to the skill development and acquisition
aspect of teams. The common approach addresses the issue of
how the team will work together. 9 Team members must
agree on their division of labor, their agenda, the skills they
must develop, and other administrative issues.0 The develop-
ment of new skills necessary to the team is essential to this
aspect of team development. Once the team is formed, its
members must learn whatever skills are necessary to team
performance. These new skills are the foundation for a com-
mon approach-the "team approach." 1
Unlike EPIPs, teams incorporate new and more flexible
forms of work organization. 2 Consider for example, the so-
called "autonomous groups," a common type of team. Autono-
mous groups are given near-total responsibility for producing a
product or service." Their decision-making authority and
scope are broader than those of the quality circles and the
quality of worklife efforts. 4 Autonomous groups are given au-
67. See id. at 53-55.
68. See Eaton & Voos, supra note 19, at 177 (asserting that the cre-
ation of a team requires "cross training" of team members and increased
responsibility for previously separated functions).
69. See KATZENBACH & SMITH, supra note 65, at 56-59 (emphasizing




72. See Eaton & Voos, supra note 19, at 177.
73. See CYNTHIA D. FISHER ET AL., HUMAN REsOURCE MANAGEMENT,
439-40 (2d ed. 1993) (the group makes the most of production decisions,
such as scheduling, assigning work, deciding on methods, and over select-
ing new members and allocating pay raises).
74. See id.
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thority to make significant logistic decisions concerning sched-
uling, work assignment, hiring, and compensation practices.75
They have the ability to alter production methods and make
major logistic decisions concerning their work process." As in
the case of quality circles, there is no additional direct compen-
sation.7
3. Summary
As the above discussion illustrates, a common thrust of the
many types of cooperative efforts is that employees undertake
tasks of a fairly specific nature that are unique to the particu-
lar product or service of their employer." In fact, to employ-
ers, an attractive characteristic of cooperative efforts is that
they provide a competitive advantage that is difficult for indus-
try competitors to replicate. 9 Such a program is deemed a
sustainable comparative advantage.0 A program is unique,
and thus difficult to imitate, when it involves an attribute
specific to that particular firm." The unique character of
workplace cooperative efforts is determined by the idiosyncrat-
ic knowledge that employees provide to the firm.
Employees participating in cooperative efforts are expected
to acquire knowledge that is specific to the particular employ-
er. Such specific knowledge would be of little value outside the
firm. In other words, employees participating in cooperative
efforts must invest heavily in "firm-specific" capital, while
employers "invest" in employees by providing the training
associated with establishing participatory programs. As dis-
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See NORTHCRAFT & NEALE, supra note 61, at 506.
78. See Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining A
Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 65 (1993)
(describing how union members frequently agree to firm-specific contracts
to help ensure their employer's survival).
79. See Patrick M. Wright et al., Matches Between Human Resources
and Strategy Among NCAA Basketball Teams, 38 AcAD. OF MGMT. J.
1052, 1053-57 (1995) (describing how strategic human resource manage-
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cussed in Part IV below, once these investments have been
made, both employers and employees may have incentives to
engage in what the ILM model calls "opportunistic behav-
ior." How such behavior may be prevented is central to un-
derstanding the legal issues surrounding workplace cooperative
efforts.
Another important characteristic of workplace cooperative
efforts is that employees are not immediately compensated for
participating in the program. Generally, employees participat-
ing in such programs do so on a "voluntary" basis.8" They un-
dertake new responsibilities, which may include working addi-
tional hours, without a corresponding increase in pay.' Em-
ployees engaging in such participatory efforts, however, may
expect some benefit in exchange for their present uncompen-
sated additional efforts. These benefits may take the form of
additional compensation in the future, increased job security,
or increased "voice" and participation in the firm's decision-
making process."
III. EXISTING VIEWS ON THE LEGALITY OF
WORKPLACE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
The dispute over the legality of workplace cooperative efforts
has turned on the interpretation of NLRA sections 8(a)(2) and
2(5).8" Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor
82. See Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the
Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 1349, 1359 n.42 (1988) (defining opportunistic behavior as "the
inefficient bread of an implicit contract").
83. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life.Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just
Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 12-19 (1993) (ex-
plaining that in internal labor markets the employees expect to be com-
pensated in the future for effort they put forth in the present).
84. See id.
85. See infra notes 304-13 and accompanying text.
86. The academic analysis of these two sections is extensive. See, e.g.,
Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Sym-
bol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1379, 1456-61 (1993)
(arguing that the National Labor Relations Act was based on a coopera-
tive scheme akin to current theories that advocate trusting collaboration);
Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System
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practice for an employer:
To dominate or interfere with the formation or administra-
tion of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it: Provided, that subject to rules and regulations
made and published by the Board pursuant to Section 156 of
this title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permit-
ting employees to confer with him during working hours
without loss of time or pay.
87
A 'labor organization" is defined in section 2(5) as:
Any organization of any kind, or agency or employee repre-
sentation committee or plan in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of deal-
ing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work."8
This statutory background has remained unchanged since
the 1935 enactment of the NLRA. The Act establishes a two-
step analysis for reviewing the legality of an employer-employ-
ee cooperative effort.8 9 First, does the cooperative effort con-
of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 171-90 (1993) (discussing
how the forms of representing employees that are present in the Ameri-
can workplace may become the basis for new labor law policies); Wilson
McLeod, Labor-Management Cooperation: Competing Visions and Labor's
Challenge, 12 INDUs. REL. L.J. 233, 277 (1990) (arguing that advocates of
workers' interests should focus their efforts on blocking management-
oriented cooperative programs because present political conditions favor
labor-management cooperation that is oriented toward management objec-
tives); Joseph B. Ryan, The Encouragement of Labor-Management Coop-
eration: Improving American Productivity Through Revision of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act, 40 UCLA L. REV. 571, 589 (1992) (recommending
legislative revisions to the National Labor Relations Act aimed at elimi-
nating the obstacles to labor-management cooperation that have impinged
American industrial productivity); Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice
and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 129, 138-48 (1993) (proposing an exception to section
8(a)(2) permitting employers to establish employee representation plans
where employees have freely chosen not to unionize). See generally Thom-
as Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Insignificance
of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499 (1986).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
89. See McLeod, supra note 86, at 277 (stating that cooperation theo-
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stitute a labor organization under section 2(5)?90 Second, if
the cooperative effort is found to be a labor organization, has
the employer dominated or interfered with its formation or
administration?91
The case law interpreting the two sections can be catego-
rized as either limiting the employers' ability to establish
workplace cooperative efforts, or conversely as permitting em-
ployers to establish such programs. The "restrictive" view
tends to limit the kind of participatory programs allowed under
the NLRA, by giving an expansive reading to sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2).92 At the other end of the spectrum, the "permissive"
view expands the types of programs that would obtain judicial
approval by narrowly interpreting the definition of a labor
organization and the conduct that constitutes domination or
support. 3 The two views articulate the major concerns ex-
pressed in the workplace cooperative programs debate, and
help scholars to understand the objectives that the Board, the
courts and Congress have pursued when delineating public
policy on this issue. The two views are discussed in this sec-
tion. In addition, this section analyzes the various policy posi-
tions determining the legality of workplace cooperative efforts,
including those taken by the Board, by Congress, and those
originating in academia.
This Article argues in Parts V and VI that these approaches
do not directly address the critical problem with workplace
cooperative efforts: the incentives that they create for employ-
ers to behave opportunistically.
A. The "Restrictive" View
The line of cases under this heading involve decisions that
permitted limiting the types of participatory programs under
sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2). 4 Decisionmakers who follow this
rists fear this analysis may bar alternatives to collective bargaining).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 218 (1959) (holding
that neither section 2(5) nor section 8(a)(2) eliminated employee commit-
tees from the term "labor organization," which resulted in a limitation on
an employer's ability to create participatory programs).
93. See infra notes 124-43 and accompanying text.
94. See Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 209-11; NLRB v. Newport News
1997] 341
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approach tend first to adopt an expansive reading of what
constitutes a "labor organization" under the Act,9" and second,
expand the categories of employer behavior that would amount
to domination or interference under section 8(a)(2).9"
Section 2(5) defines a labor organization as a group in which
employees "participate"97 and which "exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employ-
ment, or conditions of work."8
Of these statutory elements, the "dealing with" requirement
has generated the most controversy.99 Unlike some of the oth-
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
95. Employer "assistance" or "domination" under section 8(a)(2) is
legally problematic only if directed toward a "labor organization" as de-
fined in section 2(5). See Ryan, supra note 86, at 589.
96. See, e.g., Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 218 (holding that employee
committees were included in the definition of "labor organization" and
that employers were therefore not permitted to dominate them under
section 8(a)(2)).
97. Since by definition every employer-employee cooperative effort
involves employees, the first of the three elements would appear to be
relatively straightforward. Still, even this first element has generated
some controversy. Opponents of the "restrictive view" have argued for a
more narrow definition of a labor organization by requiring that the
structure of employee participation be representational in nature (i.e.,
that the employees directly involved in the participatory program serve
as the representatives of other employees in the workplace). See Cochran,
supra note 19, at 477. Although this argument has been floating around
for quite a while, see, e.g., General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234-
35 (1977), it has acquired new life as a result of the NLRB's decisions in
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994), and E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993). See infra notes
144-90 and accompanying text. While both cases held that the participa-
tory programs involved amounted to a violation of the Act, some of the
concurring opinions in those cases cited with approval the representation-
al argument. The requirement that the employee participatory program
be representational in nature implies that in programs where employees
speak only for themselves and do not purport to represent the views and
concerns of others, they do not participate, and thus, the program is not
a labor organization. See Cochran, supra note 19, at 478.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
99. This second element is commonly referred to as the functional re-
quirement. For a discussion of the level of power necessary for a labor
organization to be "dealing with" an employer, see Cochran, supra note
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er demands of the workplace cooperative efforts debate, the Su-
preme Court has spoken directly to this subject. In the 1959
case of NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., °0 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the definition of "dealing with." In Cabot Carbon the
employer had established, pursuant to a suggestion by the War
Production Board, "employee committees" at each of its
plants. 1 ' The stated purpose of these committees, established
at both union and non-union plants, was "to provide a proce-
dure for considering employees, ideas and problems of mutual
interest to employees and management."" 2 The Employee
Committees' bylaws set forth membership requirements, elec-
tion procedures, and assigned them responsibility for handling
grievances at the non-union plants. 103 The NLRB found that
the employee committees were labor organizations, the forma-
tion and administration of which had been dominated and
interfered with by the employer.0 4 The NLRB commented
19, at 480. Although it would appear that the subject matters incorporat-
ed in section 2(5) are so broad as to likely include nearly anything that
an employer would want to discuss with its employees, the Board and
some courts of appeal have interpreted the subject matter requirement
more narrowly. For example, in General Foods, the Board confronted the
legality of a participatory program involving "autonomous groups." See
General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235. The groups were part of a job
enrichment program initiated by the employer. The program was based
on the assumption that "employees desire to have a larger and more
meaningful role in their day-to-day work activities than is normally as-
signed to them in a mechanical production line operation." Id. According-
ly, the groups were designed to enlarge the powers and responsibilities of
all plant employees and to give them more power and control over their
job situations. Despite evidence that the teams made recommendations
about holiday schedules, a subject matter clearly governed by section
2(5), the Board found the program's purpose to be managerial and thus
outside of the scope of the NLRA. See id. at 1235. A similar rationale
was advanced in Sears, Roebuck, 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 244 (1985) (holding
that programs that focused on matters of work performance would not
constitute labor organizations); see also Estreicher, supra note 46, at 127
(distinguishing between off-line and on-line systems in terms of the sub-
ject matter requirement).
100. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
101. See id. at 205.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 209.
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that the committees, in addition to discussing problems ad-
dressed by their bylaws with the employer, also "[miade and
discussed proposals and requests respecting many other as-
pects of the employee relationship, including seniority, job
classifications, job bidding, makeup time, overtime records,
time cards, a merit system, wage corrections, working sched-
ules, holidays, vacations, sick leave, and improvement of work-
ing facilities and conditions."0 5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
Board,0 " finding that, although the "Employee Committees"
were clearly dominated by the employer, they were not labor
organizations under section 2(5) because they did not bargain
with the employer."° The court held that "dealing with," in
section 2(5), meant "bargaining with." °
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's
narrow interpretation and held that the NLRA's legislative
history did not support the argument that "dealing with" was
limited to situations involving traditional bargaining between
employers and employees.0 9 The Court also rejected the
employer's contention that, because the employer had retained
final authority over the committees' proposals, the employer
was not "dealing with" the committees within the meaning of
section 2(5).110 In rejecting the employer's argument, the
Court noted that, even in traditional collective bargaining
relationships, the employer has the ability to reject proposals
made at the bargaining table."' The Court reasoned that
what is distinguishable about independent labor organizations
is that the employees have the "unfettered power" to insist
upon their request."' By expanding the definition of the term
"dealing with," the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon gave an
105. I. at 207.
106. See Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1958),
rev'd, 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
107. See id. at 286 (holding that employee committees must bargain
with employers to be considered labor organizations).
108. See id. at 285.
109. See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 211 (1959).
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expansive reading to the definition of what constitutes a 'labor
organization." It thus limited an employer's ability to establish
workplace cooperative efforts that would not run afoul of sec-
tion 2(5).
Proponents of the "restrictive" view have also sought to limit
the kind of participatory programs permissible under the Act
through an expansive reading of section 8(a)(2). Specifically,
decisions following this view have developed the "form and
structure" paradigm.1 3 This approach centers the inquiry
around the question of whether the form and structure of the
participatory program is controlled by the employer.1 In
NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,"' the
Supreme Court, again in an early NLRA decision, invalidated
an employee representation plan created by the employer for
the stated purpose of giving employees a voice in establishing
working conditions and to provide a procedure to prevent and
adjust future differences."6 Although there were several
problems with the structure of tle plan,"' the Supreme
Court's main concern was that it required that any amendment
to the plan be approved by the company.1 8 The Court stated
that "such control of the form and structure of an employe [sic]
organization deprives the employees of the complete freedom of
action guaranteed to them by the Act .... .""
An interesting aspect of the form and structure paradigm is
the emphasis placed on relatively trivial matters, when, at
least until recently,120 little attention has been paid to a
much more fundamental problem. The primary emphasis has
been on whether the employer was dominating or interfering
with the decision-making process of the particular group or
program. For example, programs where the employer may veto
113. See NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308
U.S. 241, 249 (1939) (holding that employee committees must bargain
with employers to be considered labor organizations).
114. See id.
115. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
116. See id. at 244.
117. For example, employees served as representatives, and they were
paid for their services. See id.
118. See id. at 208.
119. Id.
120. See infra notes 144-72 and accompanying text.
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committee decisions tend to fare poorly before the Board."'
The dangers of interference with the decision-making process,
whether via veto power or otherwise, are not without impor-
tance. Focusing on the extent of the employer's interference
with the decision-making process of a participatory program,
however, is arguably a poor means of distinguishing between
legal and illegal workplace cooperative efforts. After all, the
employer may effectively exercise a veto in traditional collec-
tive bargaining."
Traditional collective bargaining relationships involve an
independent union, but a veto power alone does not make such
unions the instrument of the employer. 22 A better approach
to this problem would incorporate an unfortunately sometimes
overlooked factor. Namely, whether the participatory program
has a "life of its own" independent from the employer. This
theory raises some additional questions. For example, can the
employer disband the group without employee input or without
compensating employees for whatever loss the committee's
dissolution may have caused them? More generally, can the
employer engage in opportunistic behavior? This Article ex-
plores these issues in the context of the discussion of opportu-
nistic behavior under the NLRA and the recently vetoed TEAM
Act.
B. The "Permissive" View
Decisions falling under this approach respond in kind to the
two main arguments made by the restrictive view. When defin-
ing the term "labor organization," these cases tend to construe
the term "dealing with" much more narrowly." This avoids
121. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 903 (1993)
(finding that management committee members exercised an implicit man-
agement veto when process required a consensus for decisionmaking);
Rideout Memorial Hosp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1338, 1342 (1977) (finding domi-
nation where employer retained and exercised power to veto changes to
the by-laws of the employee organization).
122. See ROBERT J. FLANAGAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP 396 (1989) (describing the bilateral monopoly characteristics
of the collective bargaining process).
123. See id.
124. See Cochran, supra note 19, at 478-79.
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having a participatory program fall under the definitional
reach of Section 2(5)."s For example, in NLRB v. Streamway
Division of Scott & Fetzer Co.,2' the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit considered the legality of "in-plant representation
committees" initiated by the employer after an unsuccessful
organizing drive by an outside union. 2 7 Similar to the com-
mittees at issue in Cabot Carbon, the representation commit-
tees' stated objective was "to provide an informal yet orderly
process for communicating Company plans and programs;
defining and identifying problem areas and eliciting sugges-
tions and ideas for improving operations." 2 ' In addition, the
employer had established membership guidelines and election
procedures." Unlike Cabot Carbon, the "Representation
Committees" were not designed to process grievances. 30 The
Sixth Circuit, however, did not rely on this factual difference
when distinguishing Streamway from Cabot Carbon. Instead,
the court attempted to distinguish the two cases on a much
broader principle. The court noted that "dealing with" involved
"a more active, ongoing association between management and
employees" than that engaged in by the "Representation Com-
mittees." 3' The court went on to characterize the committees
as "part of a company plan to determine employee attitudes
regarding working conditions and other problems ... for the
Company's self-enlightenment."'32 Thus, the Scott Fetzer deci-
sion and subsequent Sixth Circuit caselaw" can be read as
standing for the proposition that participatory programs which
serve merely as communicative devices do not "deal with" the
125. See id.
126. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
127. See id.
128. Id at 289.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Id at 294.
132. Id
133. See, e.g., Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291, 1293 (6th Cir.
1989) (holding that a "President's Advisory Council," created by the em-
ployer, and including employee representatives, which met with the em-
ployer to voice complaints about work-related issues such as leave policy
and job bidding, was not dealing with, but served merely as a "means of
communication").
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employer and thus are outside the reach of section 2(5).134
With respect to section 8(a)(2), cases adhering to the "per-
missive" view have rejected the form and structure paradigm
in favor of a new paradigm. The Free Choice paradigm rests on
an underlying premise that the primary concern of labor law
should be to protect the employee's free choice of representa-
tional forms-even if the form chosen is one created by the em-
ployer. 135 In fact, Free Choice proponents, argue that the
NLRA can be understood as primarily concerned, not with the
prevention of industrial strife, but with the protection of indi-
vidual employee rights. 3 '
From this premise, the Free Choice paradigm suggests two
important conclusions that serve as guidelines in assessing the
legality of workplace cooperative efforts. First, "actual" and not
"potential" domination must be shown to establish a violation
of section 8(a)(2).137 Courts following this paradigm reason
that there is always the potential for interference and support
in the employee-employer relationship. Therefore, the potential
for domination must have been realized." Cases turning on
the element of actual, as opposed to potential domination,
involve workplace cooperative efforts that amount to what the
courts have described as weak labor organizations. 39 Those
challenging the legality of cooperative efforts in these cases
have unsuccessfully argued that the "weakness" of the labor
organizations involved is enough evidence to show domina-
tion.1 40 Second, domination must be assessed from the subjec-
134. The flawed logic of this proposition has not gone unnoticed by
labor law scholars. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 86, at 178 (arguing that
since most of what takes place in participatory programs amounts to
making proposals, there is not much left for a "communicative" group to
do other than make proposals).
135. See Kenneth 0. Alexander, Worker Participation and the Law
Once Again: Overview and Evaluation, 39 LAB. L.J. 696, 700-02 (1988);
see also Klare, supra note 19, at 50-56.
136. See Yale Note, supra note 19, at 2033-34.
137. See Cochran, supra note 19, at 483.
138. See Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167 (7th
Cir. 1955).
139., See id. at 170; Federal-Mogul Co., Coldwater Distrib. Ctr. Div. v.
NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918-19 (6th Cir. 1968); Modem Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1967).
140. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul Co., 394 F.2d at 918-19 ("[I1n the instant
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tive point of view of employees."' At first, it would appear
that a subjective test would favor employees and limit the
range of legally permissible cooperative efforts. In fact, this
language was first used in cases finding various forms of coop-
erative efforts to be in violation of section 8(a)(2).' When
the subjective element is appended to the actual domination
requirement, however, the likelihood of finding a section
8(a)(2) violation is reduced. Even if the employer intended to
dominate the group, no violation will be found if the employees
involved thought they were free to operate independently of
management.1
3
C. The Board's Current Position: Electromation, E.I. du Pont
and Beyond
Probably no recent NLRB decision has been as closely
watched as the two decisions that were supposed to settle the
debate on the legality of workplace cooperative efforts. Next,
this Article discusses the Electromation and E.I du Pont deci-
sions and also considers subsequent NLRB decisions applying
the test laid out in these two seminal decisions. An analysis of
these decisions suggests that the Board remains ambivalent as
case we are obviously dealing with a weak labor organization having no
constitution, by-laws or possessed of any means of independent financial
support. These factors may create an unstable organization susceptible to
managerial control, but no inference of actual domination can be drawn
from these facts alone.").
141. See Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 168 ("Mhe test of whether an
employee organization is employer controlled is not an objective one but
rather subjective from the standpoint of the employees.").
142. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sharples Chems. Inc., 209 F.2d 645, 652 (6th
Cir. 1954).
143. Such was the situation in Federal-Mogul Co., where the court
noted that although management had attempted to control an employee
participating in the committee, no violation lay as the employee always
thought that "[he was free to report back anything he felt important,
including management's attempts to limit his discussions." Federal-Mogul,
394 F.2d at 918. Professor Barenberg has recently explained the flaw in
this reasoning. He argues that the main drawback of employer-sponsored
representation plans lies in "[tiheir systematic coercive and distorting
effect on workers' choice over modes of workplace governance rather than
in their systematic deflection of worker representatives' conduct as honest
agents." Barenberg, supra note 86, at 1458.
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to whether to follow the "restrictive" or the "permissive" views.
1. Electromation
In Electromation, the employer created several "Action Com-
mittees" in a non-unionized facility."" When announcing the
creation of the committees, the company president stated their
purpose was to "meet and try to come up with ways to resolve
[several problems recently identified by employees in a series
of meetings with management].""' The employer drafted the
membership guidelines and policy objective for each commit-
tee." ' Each committee consisted of six employees, one or two
managers and the Employee Benefits Manager.14 ' Employees
volunteered through sign-up sheets, and participation was
limited to one committee at a time." 8 The committees met for
about three months, at which time further meetings were sus-
pended as the result of an organizing campaign sponsored by
the Teamsters. "9
In an almost apologetic tone, the Board concluded that
Electromation's Action Committees violated section 8(a)(2) 5 °
144. The "Action Committees" were formed as the result of a series of
meetings between management and employees. See Electromation, Inc.
309 N.L.R.B. 990, 990 (1992). The meetings were held to discuss the
employees' displeasure with a number of changes that had been made in
an effort to reduce production costs. See id. at 990-92. The Action Com-
mittees were designated as follows: Absenteeism/Infractions; Non Smoking
Policy; Communication Network; Pay Progressions for Premium Positions;
and Attendance Bonus Program. See id.





150. See id. at 990. The Board explained:
[Tihese findings rest on the totality of the record evidence, and
they are not intended to suggest that employee committees
formed under other circumstances for other purposes would nec-
essarily be deemed "labor organizations" or that employer actions
like some of those at issue here would necessarily be found, in
isolation or in other contexts, to constitute unlawful support,
interference, or domination.
Id Similarly, in his concurring opinion, Member Devaney indicated that
under section 8(a)(2) there is significant latitude for employers to imple-
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The Board began its analysis with the legislative history of
sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2).' This search for legislative guid-
ance led the Board to two important conclusions. First, the
definition of a "labor organization" under section 2(5) was in-
tended to be broad enough to include the "employee represen-
tation committee" type of organization.152 Second, although
the dangers of employer domination and interference at the
formation stage were significant because the employer's act of
setting up and running employee "representation" groups
robbed employees of the freedom to choose their own represen-
tatives, it was equally clear that there was room for programs
which did not rob employees of their right to select their own
representatives. 5 ' These findings, based on legislative histo-
ry, are significant because they illustrate the Board's ambiva-
lence to choosing between the "restrictive" or "permissive"
views. While the Board, at least in this decision, appears to
have been ready to accept the Free Choice paradigm, it was
unwilling to risk allowing employers to establish cooperative
efforts that could eviscerate the collective bargaining process
with impunity."M
The Board then proceeded to answer the two following ques-
tions. First, at what point does an employee committee cease
to be a protected communication device and become a labor
organization?' Second, what kind of employer conduct con-
stitutes domination and interference with a labor organiza-
ment workplace cooperative efforts. See id. at 999-1003. He would not
include as labor organizations programs relating to managerial issues
such as quality, productivity, and efficiency. See id. Member Oviatt ech-
oed the same theme in his opinion. He recited the employers' cry of the
need to improve efficiency and productivity in order to remain competi-
tive in the world economy and the concern that present laws might serve
as roadblocks to "[clompanies' ability to perform more efficiently and to
respond promptly to competitive conditions." See id. at 1003.
151. See id. at 992-94 (finding that a "critical part" of the Wagner Act
was to end company dominated labor organizations).
152. See id. at 994.
153. See id. at 993.
154. See McLeod, supra note 86, at 289-90 (arguing that the possibility
exists for corporations to use the "rhetoric of participation and mutuality"
to derail collective bargaining).
155. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 990.
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tion?56 The Board applied a three pronged test to these ques-
tions. According to the Board, a given group is a labor organi-
zation if "(1) employees participate, (2) the organization exists,
at least in part, for the purpose of dealing with employers, and
(3) these dealings concern, conditions of work or other statuto-
ry subjects, such as grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, or hours of employment."157 As to the issue of whether
the organization's purpose must be employee representation,
the Board noted that such an organization meets the statutory
definition under section 2(5) if it also meets the employee par-
ticipation criteria and deals with conditions of work or other
statutory subjects.'58
The Board found all the elements satisfied, and specifically
commented on the meaning of the "dealing with" and the "rep-
resentation" elements of the test. With respect to the "dealing
with" element, the Board began its analysis by noting that the
term should, as it had been in the past, be broadly construed
to include situations other than bargaining.' The Board em-
phasized that the Action Committees were created in response
to employees' dissatisfaction with employment conditions and
with the hope that the employees would help management
"come up with ways to resolve these problems." 0 Thus, the
Board concluded, the Action Committees were created in order
to solve employment problems through a bilateral process, a
matter which fell squarely under the "dealing with" element as
interpreted by Cabot Carbon.' After this bold restatement of
a broad interpretation of the term "dealing with," the Board re-
treated to a more guarded position and observed that an orga-
156. See id.
157. Id at 994.
158. See id. ("Any group, including an employee representation commit-
tee, may meet the statutory definition of labor organization' even if it
lacks a formal structure, has no elected officers, constitution or bylaws,
does not meet regularly, and does not require the payment of initiation
fees or dues.").
159. See id. at 995 (discussing Cabot Carbon to illustrate the broad na-
ture of the term "dealing with").
160. See id. at 997. The employer had testified as to the magnitude of
the problems between management and labor and that further unilateral
management action would not likely resolve them. See id.
161. See id.
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nization whose purpose is limited to performing "essentially a
managerial or adjudicative" function would not be considered a
"labor organization" subject to section 2(5).162
The Board further determined whether those employees
involved in the Action Committees were acting in a representa-
tive capacity.16 According to the Board, it was clear that the
employer in Electromation contemplated that the Action Com-
mittees would serve a representative function.' The Board
noted that the employee members of the committees were
expected to talk "back and forth" with other employees in order
to generate solutions to problems identified by the employer
before the creation of the committees.' Having found that
the employees served a representative function, the Board did
not have to decide whether a program that lacks a representa-
tive element could be considered a labor organization."
Having found the Action Committees to be labor organiza-
tions, the Board then discussed the employer domination and
interference issue. The Board focused on whether management
created the organization, whether management determined the
organization's structure and function and whether the
162. See id. at 995. This "de minimis" argument was developed in prior
cases cited with approval in Electromation. See General Foods Corp., 231
N.L.R.B. 1232, 1235 (1977) (holding that the employer-created job enrich-
ment program composed of employee work crews did not exist "to deal
with management concerning labor relations on behalf of employers," and
consequently was not a labor organization under section 2(5) of the Act);
Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1121 (1977) (stating that the
Grievance Committee was not created to deal with the employer on be-
half of employees to address their grievances); John Ascuaga's Nugget,
230 N.L.R.B. 275, 275-76 (1977) (finding that an employees' organization
which resolved employees' grievances but did not interact with manage-
ment was not a labor organization within the meaning of section 2(5)).
163. See Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Member Devaney's concurring opinion elaborated on this theme.
See id. at 999-1003. Member Devaney would require that the representa-
tional element be established before a given cooperative effort could be
found to be a labor organization. See id. at 1002. In Devaney's view, a
finding that an employee group acted in a representative capacity is a
prerequisite to the conclusion that the group is a labor organization. See
id.
19971 353
HeinOnline  -- 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 353 1996-1997
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.49:323
organization's continued existence was contingent on manage-
ment."7 According to the Board, because "the Action Commit-
tees were the creation of the [employer] and since the impetus
for their continued existence rested with the [employer] and
not with the employees," it was clear that the employer domi-
nated their formation and administration and unlawfully sup-
ported them.1 8
The Board's focus on whether the Action Committees' "con-
tinued existence" rested with the employer is noteworthy for
three reasons. First, by focusing on the "continued existence"
factor, the Board shifted the inquiry under section 8(a)(2) away
from such issues as the employer's motive or whether the em-
ployees believed the committees to be a labor organization.6 9
These inquiries were likely to result in ambiguous applica-
tions, and the change leads to a much more straightforward
test. Second, although the Board and some courts had previ-
ously discussed whether a cooperative program was dependent
on the employer, they had mainly addressed the independence
of the decision-making process, not the independence of the
committees themselves. 7 ' Finally, this shift is consistent
167. See id. at 997-98.
168. See id. at 998.
169. The Board recognized its shift in focus:
[Als noted previously (fn. 24), Board precedent and decisions of
the Supreme Court indicate that the presence of anti-union mo-
tive is not critical to finding an 8(a)(2) violation. We also see no
basis in the statutory language, the legislative history, or deci-
sions apart from Scott & Fetzer to require a finding that the
employees believe their organizations to be a labor union.
Id at 996.
170. Some of the concurring opinions reiterated this concern for the
independence of the decision-making process. For example, in his concur-
ring opinion, Member Raudabaugh proposed an altogether different test
to determine whether there had been domination and interference by the
employer. See id. at 1013. In discussing the first factor of his proposed
test, the extent of the employer's involvement in the structure and opera-
tion of the committee, Raudabaugh conceded that the fact that the em-
ployer initiates the idea of a participatory program, or that the employer
suggests the rules and policies of the labor organization is not sufficient
to condemn it. See id. Instead, Raudabaugh focused on the decision-mak-
ing process and on the extent of management participation within the
group. Raudabaugh therefore never mentioned the "continued existence"
354
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with this Article's thesis. The problem with cooperative efforts
is the incentive they create for employers to behave
opportunistically.171 As long as the employer can unilaterally
alter the internal labor market arrangement, whether by ter-
minating a workplace cooperative effort or the employees that
have been involved in the implementation and operation of the
program, these employees risk losing their human capital in-
vestments. By requiring that the "organization" have an exis-
tence independent of the employer, the Board creates mecha-
nisms that prevent or at least minimize the likelihood of op-
portunistic behavior. Unfortunately, although the language in
Electromation could be interpreted to require complete inde-
pendence between the employer and the labor organization,
recent decisions call into question how far the Board is willing
to go with respect to this issue.'
2. E.I. du Pont
In E.I. du Pont, the employer created six safety committees
and one fitness committee at one of its unionized plants.'
Management decided which working groups or areas would
participate and which employees to invite.'74 Where the num-
ber of volunteers exceeded the desired number of members,
management selected those who would serve on the committee.
Employees served on the committees for indefinite periods of
time, without regular rotation, and received their regular pay
for the time spent attending meetings and performing commit-
tee duties.175 The company provided the committees with
meeting places, equipment and supplies, and also retained the
authority to modify or terminate them. 7 ' The committees,
which included both employees and managerial staff, operated
factor alluded to in the majority's decision, focusing instead on the deci-
sion-making characteristics of the group.
171. See infra Part V.D.
172. See infra Parts III.C.3, III.D-E.
173. E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 906 (1993). The safety committees
had operated for a number of years but were limited to managerial par-
ticipation. See id. at 905.
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on a consensus approach to decisionmaking, and in
management's view served as representatives for all other
employees in the plant.177 The committees were created over
union objections and a request by the union to form a joint
labor-management committee to deal with health and safe-
ty.17s The administrative law judge dissolved the committees,
finding that they constituted labor organizations under section
2(5), and further that the employer had dominated their forma-
tion and administration.179
In E.I. du Pont, the Board majority, while applying the prin-
ciples established in Electromation, expressed its intent "to
provide guidance for those seeking to implement lawful cooper-
ative programs between employees and management," and "to
address issues raised by employee participation committees
which exist in circumstances where employees have selected an
exclusive collective-bargaining representative." 8 ' The Board
turned first to the labor organization question. In applying the
three-part Electromation test, the Board concentrated on the
"dealing with" requirement.' The Board defined the term
"dealing with" as entailing "a pattern or practice in which a
group of employees, over time, makes proposals to manage-
ment, management responds to these proposals by acceptance
or rejection by word or deed, and compromise is not re-
quired." s2 The Board emphasized two elements of this defini-
tion: the "pattern or practice" and "proposals" elements.'83
With respect to "pattern or practice," the Board stated:
[I]f the evidence establishes such a pattern or practice, or
that the group exists for a purpose of following such a pat-
177. See id. at 895. The Personal Effectiveness Process handbook,
which governed the committees' operation, gave the following definition of
consensus: "consensus is reached when all members of the group, includ-
ing its leader, are willing to accept a decision." Id.
178. See id. at 906-07.
179. See id. at 910-18.
180. Id. at 893.
181. The Board found that the first and third elements of the
Electromation test were satisfied as there was no question that employees
participated in the committees, or that the committees had discussed
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tern or practice, the element of dealing is present. However,
if there are only isolated instances in which the group makes
ad hoc proposals to management followed by a management
response of acceptance or rejection by word or deed, the ele-
ment of dealing is missing."'
Concerning the "proposals" element, the Board described
three situations where they would not have been presented
and where consequently "no dealing with" would be found."
The Board stated that situations involving a "brainstorming"
group, a committee that exists for the purpose of exchanging
information, or a "suggestion box" do not constitute "dealing
with," as no collective proposals are being made."" The com-
mittees involved in this case, however, were found not to fall
under any of the three safe havens.8 7
Having found the committees to be labor organizations, the
Board, in an approach similar to Electromation, briefly dis-
cussed the issues of domination and interference. Unlike the
discussion in Electromation, however, the Board shifted its
focus from whether the "continued existence" of the committees
depended on a fiat by management and instead focused on the
issue of the committees' independence in their decision-making
power. The Board paid particular attention to the fact that
management, by requiring a consensus on all decisions, main-
tained an implicit veto power over the committees."' Al-
though the Board noted that the employer had the power to
"change or abolish any committees at will," s' this factor does
not appear to have been central to the decision. The Board
concluded that the committees' structure supported a finding
that the employer dominated the administration of all seven
committees in violation of section 8(a)(2). 90
184. Id.
185. See id. at 894-95.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 896.
189. Id.
190. As in Electromation, Member Devaney filed a separate concurrence
and noted that the employer's conduct would also be unlawful under his
"narrower and more historically focused perspective." See id. at 898
(Devaney, Member, concurring). A portion of Devaney's reasoning is of
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3. Recent Developments
Given all the attention the Electromation and E.I du Pont
decisions have received in academic and professional circles, it
is somewhat surprising how little attention has been given to
more recent NLRB decisions involving workplace cooperative
efforts.'91 This section reviews the salient themes in some of
these decisions. In particular, I will discuss how the Board is
currently applying the Electromation standard.
The issue of the legality of workplace cooperative efforts
continues to be litigated before the NLRB. The decisions in the
more recent cases are interesting because they demonstrate
that, although the Board will most likely find a violation of
section 8(a)(2), it continues to struggle with the Electromation
test.'92 In particular, following Chairman William Gould's ap-
particular interest to this Article's thesis. When discussing whether the
employer in E.I. du Pont dominated the administration of the safety and
fitness committees, Devaney initially appeared to focus on the "continued
existence" issue. See id. at 901. He stated, "I find it difficult to conceive
of a situation where the very existence of an employee committee de-
pends on the will of the employer that would not merit a finding that
the employer "dominated" the committee." Id& However, in the next sen-
tence of his opinion he takes the breath out of this argument by stating
that "an employer's domination of the administration of an employee
committee is not, taken alone, an unfair labor practice." Id.
191. The only discussion of these more recent decisions that I have
found is in a speech delivered by Chairman Gould. See William B. Gould,
Beyond "Them and Us" Litigation: The Clinton Board's Administrative
Reforms and Decisions Promoting Labor-Management Cooperation, Ad-
dress Before the National Labor Relations Board Region Twenty-Five and
Indiana School of Law, Indianapolis Seventieth Annual Seminar on La-
bor-Management Relations (Feb. 29, 1996), in 1996 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) 42, at d27 (Mar. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Gould's Address] (discussing
several recent NLRB decisions and noting that the Board has increased
its support for employee cooperative programs).
192. The pace of litigation of section 8(a)(2) complaints appears to have
remained at the same level as before the Electromation decision. It has
been reported that prior to 1993, section 8(a)(2) complaints generated an
average of about three NLRB decisions per year. See Fact Finding Re-
port, supra note 1, at 54. Following the Electromation (decided December
1992) and E.I. du Pont (decided May 1993) decisions, the Board has
issued an average of about three section 8(a)(2) decisions per year. From
May 1993 until August 1996, the Board decided eleven section 8(a)(2)
cases: Research Federal Credit Union, 310 N.L.R.B. 56 (1993); Ryder
[Vol.49:323358
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pointment to the Board,193 the language in the cases appears
to hedge towards a more flexible approach than that suggested
in Electromation.
The first four cases decided by the Board after the
Electromation and E.L du Pont decisions dealing with a section
8(a)(2) complaint were decided prior to Chairman Gould's ap-
pointment.194 All four cases were decided against the employ-
ers and, in general, they represent a fairly straightforward
application of Electromation.'95
The appointment of Chairman Gould, however, marked a
Distribution Resources, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 814 (1993); Peninsula Gen.
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 312 N.L.R.B. 582 (1993); Magan Med. Clinic, Inc., 314
N.L.R.B. 1083 (1994); Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110
(1995); Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995); Vons Grocery Co., 320
N.L.R.B. 53 (1995); Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 1154 (1995);
Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1995); Webeor Packaging, Inc., 319
N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995); Simmons Indus., Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 152
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1155 (May 20, 1996). There is also an administrative law
judge's decision awaiting review before the Board: Polaroid Corp., 1996
NLRB LEXis 377, at *24 (June 14, 1996) (finding that an employee par-
ticipation group established by the employer to address issues of pay,
policy, benefit, and practice was a labor organization, and that by domi-
nating the group the employer had violated section 8(a)(2)).
The Board has found section 8(a)(2) violations in nine of the eleven
cases decided since Electromation and E.I. du Pont.
193. Professor Gould was confirmed as NLRB Chairman on March 2,
1994. See Senate Confirms Gould Nomination to NLRB; Feinstein, Cohen
And Browning Also Approved, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA),. 41 at AA-1
(Mar. 3, 1994).
194. See supra note 192.
195. In Research Federal Credit Union, for example, the employer,
following the commencement of an organizing campaign by an outside
union, introduced so called employee involvement teams. The teams were
composed of representatives from each department of the company includ-
ing some management representatives, and discussed topics such as
smoking policies, part-time benefits, and annual performance reviews. See
Research Federal Credit Union, 310 N.L.R.B. at 61-62. The expressed
purpose of the committees was to provide a means for employees to for-
mally address matters of concern, and then to present these concerns,
together with recommendations for their solution, to the Board of Direc-
tors. See id. at 62. The Board affirmed the administrative law judge
decision, finding that the committees were a labor organization and that
the employer had dominated and interfered with their formation and
administration. See id. at 65-66.
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slight change in the tone of the Board's treatment of workplace
cooperative efforts. Consider, for example, the first section
8(a)(2) case decided by the Board following his confirmation:
Keeler Brass Automotive Group.19 While the majority analy-
sis is similar to that found in Electromation, Chairman Gould's
concurrence raises some interesting issues. Gould paid special
attention to the degree of independence that should be enjoyed
by the employee participation group which, he concludes, is a
matter of degree.197 The spectrum ranges from situations in-
volving a "minimal degree of employer involvement,"198 as
previously encountered by the Seventh Circuit in Chicago
Rawhide Manufacturing Company v. NLRB.'" to situations
involving a higher degree of employer involvement, as in
Electromation.°° Gould then suggested guidelines for those
196. 317 N.L.R.B. 1110. In Keeler Brass Automotive Group, the Board
confronted a grievance committee which, after eight years of operations,
was being re-structured by the employer. See id. at 1110. The committee
procedures and composition were decided by the employer. See id. Com-
mittee members were elected by employees to two-year terms. See id.
Evidence was presented that the committee's decisions concerning griev-
ances were not final, but were instead subject to review or modification
by the employer. See id. at 1115. In reversing the administrative law
judge, the Board found that the committee was a labor organization, and
that it was dominated by the employer. See id. at 1113-16.
197. See id. at 1116-19 (Gould, Chairman, concurring). Chairman
Gould's opinion cites with approval the Seventh Circuit decision enforcing
the Board's Order in Electromation. See id.
The Supreme Court has explained that domination of a
labor organization exists where the employer controls the form
and structure of a labor organization such that the employees
are deprived of complete freedom and independence of action as
guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, and that the princi-
pal distinction between an independent labor organization and an
employer-dominated organization lies in the unfettered power of
the independent organization to determine its own actions.
Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1170 (7th Cir. 1994).
198. Keeler Brass, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1118.
199. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955). In Chicago Rawhide, the committee
originated with the employees and met outside the presence of manage-
ment. Management did not determine which subjects would be consid-
ered, nor membership; and it did not have veto power over committee
recommendations.
200. See Keeler Brass, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1118-19.
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cases falling between the two extremes. First, the Board
should inquire how the employee group came into being.201
According to Gould, however, it does not follow that because
the idea to form a participatory program originated with man-
agement, there will necessarily be an 8(a)(2) violation:
[I]f, for example, the employer did nothing more than tell
employees that it wanted their participation in decisions con-
cerning working conditions and suggested that they set up a
committee for such participation, I would find no domination
provided employees controlled the structure and function of
the committee and their participation was voluntary. °2
Second, when deciding whether there was unlawful "domina-
tion," the Board should look at the circumstances surrounding
the creation of the participatory program.03 Thus, in Keeler
Brass, Gould argued that there were several factors which
could lead to a fimding of no domination."4 For example, the
employer had not created the committee in response to an
organizing effort, participation in the committee was volun-
tary, and all voting committee members were freely elected by
the rest of the employees. 25 However, continued Chairman
Gould, the balance of factors pointed to unlawful domination.
In particular, Gould was concerned that the employer had
established membership guidelines and the election procedure,
conducted the election, and that the committee could not even
decide when it would meet without the employer's approv-
201. See id. at 1119.
202. Id. This portion of Chairman Gould's opinion echoes both the
concurring opinion of Member Raudabaugh in Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B.
at 1013 (stating that the fact that the employer initiates the participato-
ry program, or that the employer establishes the program's rules and
policies, is not sufficient reason to condemn the program under the Act),
and the concurrence of Member Devaney in E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at
902 ("I see no unlawful behavior or threat to employees' Section 7 rights
when employers form employee committees with management members,
provide such committees with funds, time, space and compensation, as-
sign the committees agendas, and dissolve them at will.")
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al.206
Although Chairman Gould cited with approval the
Electromation test, he also placed greater emphasis on the
domination issue than had earlier post-Electromation Board
decisions. It is not clear, however, whether Chairman Gould's
guidelines to decide the question of domination will expand or
limit the scope of the Electromation test.
Two other post Electromation and E.I. du Pont decisions are
worth mentioning, as they suggest how the Board appears to
have interpreted the Electromation analysis with respect to
selecting between the "restrictive" and "permissive" views. In
the cases of Stoody Co. Division of Thermadyne, Inc.," ' and
Vons Grocery Co.,2°s the Board, for the first time since the
Electromation decision, found in favor of the employer in an
8(a)(2) case. Stoody Company arose after the employer's cre-
ation of a "handbook committee" whose stated purpose was
"[niot to discuss wages, benefits, or working conditions, but
was to gather information about different areas in the hand-
book that were inconsistent with our current practices, that
were obsolete, or that were misunderstood by employees, so we
could get them cleared up as soon as possible."0 9 At its first
meeting, the committee discussed vacation time, as well as
other non-proscribed subjects." ' Shortly after this first meet-
ing, the employer discovered that a union attempting to orga-
nize the workplace had filed 8(a)(2) unfair labor practices
charges, and disbanded the committee.2 ' While the "hand-
book" committees were intended to act as representatives of
other employees, 21 2 and although at their first and only meet-
ing the committee discussed and made proposals, regarding
vacation time (clearly a statutory subject under section
2(5)),213 the Board found that the "dealing with" requirement
206. See id.
207. 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995).
208. 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995).
209. Stoody, 320 N.L.R.B. at 25.
210. See id. at 19.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 25.
213. See id.
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had not been satisfied.214 The Board, relying on a passage of
its E.I. Du Pont decision, stated that "dealing with" requires a
showing of a "pattern or practice, or that the group exists for a
purpose of following such a pattern or practice," of employees
making proposals to management and management responding
to such proposals.215 The Board reasoned that since the
"handbook committee" met only once, there was no evidence of
a pattern or practice of "dealing with" and, contrary to the ad-
ministrative law judge's opinion, even if the committee had
held additional meetings, they would not have resulted in
proposals to management regarding working conditions.21
A similar fact pattern arose in another decision in which the
Board refused to find a violation of section 8(a)(2). In Vons
Grocery Co.,27 the employer created a "Quality Circle Group"
to discuss and address specific operational concerns and prob-
lems."8 Several years after its formation, the group, for the
first time, strayed from its consideration of purely operational
matters and discussed issues related to a dress code and an
accident point system.1 9 After a couple of meetings during
which these matters were further developed, the group pre-
sented proposals to both the employer and the union which
represented employees at the plant.
220
Following union complaints that the Quality Group had
exceeded the scope of allowable activities, the employer first
reassured the union that there would be no further discussion
of topics other than operational matters, and then invited a
union representative to attend all group meetings.". Follow-
ing a rationale similar to that utilized in Stoody Co., the Board
held that the Quality Group did not constitute a labor organi-
zation under section 2(5).' The Board found no evidence of a
"pattern or practice" of making proposals to management on
214. See id. at 20.
215. See id. (citing E.I du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894).
216. See id. at 20.





222. See id. at 54.
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statutory subjects, and that there was little likelihood that the
one incident in which such subjects were discussed would de-
velop into a pattern. 2
These recent cases suggest that the Board is somewhat am-
bivalent with respect to adopting the "permissive" or "restric-
tive" views of workplace cooperative efforts. While some of the
language in Electromation and E.L Du Pont is consistent with
the "restrictive" view, the Keeler Brass Automotive Group,
Stoody Co., and Vons Grocery decisions contain language more
consistent with the "permissive" view, at least regarding the
definition of the term "dealing with" and the question of what
kind of employer conduct amounts to domination and interfer-
ence.
D. The TEAM Act
Following the landmark 1994 election in which the Republi-
can party regained control of both houses of Congress, Repre-
sentative Gunderson (R-WI) introduced the "Teamwork for
Employees and Managers Act of 1995 ("TEAM Act")."' The
TEAM Act was subsequently vetoed by President Clinton.22
It remains, however, illustrative of the current debate. It was
designed to amend section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA in order to
facilitate the development of cooperative efforts in the
workplace.22 When introducing the TEAM Act, Representa-
tive Gunderson, followed the well established "competitive
environment" argument,"2 stating that "the escalating de-
mands of global competition have compelled an increasing
223. See id. As to what constitutes a "proposal," see Dillon Stores, 319
N.L.R.B. 1245, 1251 (1995) (holding that a program involving employee
meetings where employees asked "can we?" "could we?" "will the employ-
er," or "will there be?" constituted proposals and thus amounted to "deal-
ing with" under section 2(5)).
224. H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 295, 104th Cong. (1995).
225. See 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), supra note 4, at d4.
226. See Statement by Rep. Gunderson and Text of Teamwork for Em-
ployees and Managers Act, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 20, at d25 (Jan.
31, 1995) (hereinafter Gunderson's Statement]. Similar legislation was also
introduced in 1993. See H.R. 1529, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 669, 103d Cong.
(1993).
227. See Gunderson's Statement, supra note 226.
[Vol.49:323364
HeinOnline  -- 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 364 1996-1997
WHOSE TEAM ARE YOU ON?
number of employers in the United States to make dramatic
changes in workplace and employer-employee relationships" of
the kind that involve an "enhanced role for the employee in
workplace decision-making. " "s Representative Gunderson
concluded that an amendment to section 8(a)(2) was needed to
nurture workplace creativity and confront "America's greatest
economic challenges." He noted that the NLRB's current
interpretation of section 8(a)(2) is constrained by a mind-set
more attuned to "a very turbulent time in labor-management
relations" than the 1990s workplace."0 He further argued
that employee involvement programs are widely used in the
United States"' and that recent surveys indicate that em-
ployees want more involvement in decisions affecting them in
the workplace. 2
In its Findings and Purposes section, the TEAM Act stated
both the "competitive environment" argument and that the
establishment of participatory programs has a positive impact
on both productivity and competitiveness, and the lives of
employees.' The section also stated that recent attempts by
employers to establish participatory programs "[hiave not done
so to interfere with the collective bargaining rights guaranteed
by the labor laws, as was the case in the 1930s when employ-
ers established deceptive sham 'company unions' to avoid
unionization." Nonetheless, it concluded, employee involve-
ment programs are currently threatened by the Board's prohi-
bition against employer-dominated company unions.'
The TEAM Act stated its purpose to be "to protect legitimate
employee involvement programs against governmental interfer-
ence; to preserve existing protections against deceptive, coer-
cive employer practices; and to allow legitimate employee in-
228. See H.R. 743 § 2; Gunderson's Statement, supra note 226.
229. Gunderson's Statement, supra note 226.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id. (citing a survey by the Princeton Survey Research Associ-
ates on behalf of Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers).
233. See H.R. 743 § 2(a)(4).
234. Id § 2(a)(6).
235. See id. § 2(a)(7).
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volvement programs to continue to evolve and proliferate." '
To accomplish these three objectives, the bill asked Congress
to amend section 8(a)(2) as follows:
Provided further, that it shall not constitute or be evidence of
an unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an employ-
er to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organi-
zation or entity of any kind, in which employees participate,
to address matters of mutual interest, including issues of
quality, productivity and efficiency, and which does not have,
claim, or seek authority to negotiate or enter into collective
bargaining agreements with the employer or to amend exist-
ing collective bargaining agreements between the employer
and any labor organization. 87
E. The Dunlop Commission
At the same time that these legislative efforts to amend sec-
tion 8(a)(2) were taking place,' President Clinton's Commis-
sion on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, the so-
called Dunlop Commission, was reviewing the current state of
worker-management relations in the United States." In De-
cember 1994, the Commission issued its final report on the
future of worker-management relations.24 Although the final
report did not specifically address the TEAM Act, it dealt with
the issue of employee involvement and raised some interesting
points related to the themes discussed in this Article.
The Commission identified what it believed to be the main
obstacle to the diffusion of workplace cooperative efforts: a
general skepticism on the part of workers. The Commission
stated that, although there is no clear consensus on what has
prevented the further spread of workplace cooperative efforts,
a commonly cited factor is workers' lack of faith that manage-
ment will use the "[fIruits of workers participation to benefit
236. Id. § 2(b)(1)-(3).
237. Id. § 3.
238. These efforts originated in 1993 with the introduction of a similar
bill by Representative Gunderson. See H.R. 1529, 103d Cong. (1993).
239. See generally Fact Finding Report, supra note 1.
240. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1994) [hereinafter Final Report].
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employees as well as shareholders." ' 1 The Fact Finding Re-
port went on to note that workers' biggest fear is that improve-
ments in productivity and efficiency obtained from cooperative
efforts will result in the loss of their jobs.242
In the Commission's view, this "lack of trust" is neither irra-
tional, nor the result of class animosity between workers and
managers, but can be understood as a rational response by
employees to the economic realities that workplace cooperative
efforts bring into the employment relationship.243 The Com-
mission recognized that participation in workplace cooperative
efforts requires employees to make human capital investments,
and that recovering the "returns" on their investments requires
a long-term employment relationship. According to the Com-
mission:
Building a trusting relationship between workers and em-
ployers so that workers are highly motivated and contribute
their ideas to the firm constitutes a long term invest-
ment .... Employee participation and related workplace
changes entail high start-up costs for training, consulting
services and management and employee time away from
"normal" activities. Yet ,the benefits are not likely to be real-
ized until some time in the future and often are difficult to
predict or measure.244
In its Final Report, the Commission offered a solution to the
competing concerns surrounding workplace cooperative ef-
forts.245 "[The Commission believes that it is in the national
interest to promote expansion of employee participation, pro-
vided [that such a goal] does not impede employee choice of
whether or not to be represented by an independent labor
organization.""46 The Commission noted, however, that as
presently implemented, some participatory programs may
241. See Fact Finding Report, supra note 1, at 49 (reviewing testimony
and survey data gathered at public hearings).
242. The Fact Finding Report further notes that the lack of trust is
not endemic to workers, but is also widespread among union leaders and
middle level managers. See id. at 50.
243. See id.
244. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
245. See Final Report, supra note 240, at 7.
246. Id.
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violate section 8(a)(2) because, although designed to improve
productivity and quality, such programs also tend to involve
discussions concerning working conditions and compensation
issues."
As a remedial measure, the Commission recommended con-
gressional clarification of section 8(a)(2), "so that employee
involvement programs-such as those relating to production,
quality, safety and health, training or voluntary dispute reso-
lution-are legal as long as they do not allow for a rebirth of
the company unions the section was designed to outlaw." 48
More specifically, the Commission recommended that the legal-
ity of nonunion employee participation programs depends not
on whether they involve discussion of terms and conditions of
work or compensation which are incidental to the broad pur-
poses of these programs.24"
The Commission, however, emphasized the continued need
to prohibit "company dominated labor organizations" and to
ensure that encouraging employee participation in nonunion
settings would not adversely affect'employees' ability to select
independent union representation." ° Achieving these two
goals will require that employees involved in these participato-
ry experiments be assured the same protections from retalia-
tion for expressing their views on workplace issues as is cur-
rently accorded unionized employees."' The Final Report not-
ed that such protection is currently available under the NLRA,
since such expressions constitute concerted activities for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection. 2
The Commission's recommendations are surprising when
viewed in light of its discussion concerning the "lack of trust"
factor. The Commission, to the extent that it indicated that a
possible solution to the problem of workplace cooperative ef-
forts would be to limit the scope of section 8(a)(2) by excluding
from its reach programs where wages and working conditions
are discussed incidentally, apparently took an approach similar
247. See id.
248. Id.
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to that advanced under the TEAM Act. 3 Although the
Commission's recommendations clearly differ from the proposal
advanced in the TEAM Act, both by recognizing the continued
need to prevent the creation of "company unions" and the need
to protect nonunionized employees' ability to express their
views on workplace issues, the Commission failed to provide
any protection against the opportunistic behavior that may
result from the impact that workplace cooperative efforts have
on the employment relationship.
F. So, What's Wrong With What We Have?
The debate concerning workplace cooperative efforts has
been framed thus far in terms of the restrictive/permissive
distinction. The focus of the debate has been on whether sec-
tion 8(a)(2) is intended to protect employees' free choice in
selecting a bargaining representative or to protect the integrity
of the bargaining process by assuring complete independence
between employers and the employees' representative. The
Board's current position, as illustrated by Electromation and
its progeny, appears to waver between the restrictive and per-
missive views. The TEAM Act, although purportedly protecting
the independence of the collective bargaining process, clearly
favored the adoption. of the "permissive" view. The Dunlop
Commission, recognizing that neither extreme adequately
addressed the problem, instead adopted a hybrid approach
which had some of the free choice elements of the "permissive"
view, while also considering the need for some continued de-
gree of independence between the employer and the employees'
representative.
This Article will argue that both the permissive and restric-
253. Professor Thomas Kochan, a member of the Dunlop Commission,
distinguished the Commission's proposal from the TEAM Act by noting
that the Commission's recommendation would not have drawn new lines
between permissible and nonpermissible subjects of discussion for partici-
patory programs. Instead, Kochan argued, the Commission's recommen-
dation only sought to clarify that "[e]mployee participation would not be
judged illegal solely because participants discussed terms and conditions
of employment as an incidental part of the process." Labor Law Reform:
Clarification, Not Elimination of Section 8(a)(2) Needed, Kochan Says,
1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at d18 (Jan. 9, 1995).
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tive views are misguided because they fail to address what
appears to be a more serious consequence of the formation of
workplace cooperative efforts-the incentives they create for
employers to behave opportunistically. The following two sec-
tions develop this argument.
IV. A BIT OF THEORY: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL
LABOR MARKETS
The employment relationship has a variety of forms.'
Employers and employees may enter into discrete contracts of
fairly short duration with no expectation of continued employ-
ment. 5 Such arrangements encompass what some econo-
mists term the external labor market ("ELM").2  The ELM
posits that workers seek new jobs by searching across an in-
dustry for the best conditions of employment. In general, ELMs
are considered relatively competitive due to worker mobility
and the competition between firms for these workers. 7
The ELM theory makes two basic assumptions. First, that
employees' tasks are of a general nature, such that there is
very little in the task specific to the particular organiza-
tion." s "General skills," learned by the employee at his or her
254. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 57-81 (1975).
255. See id.
256. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Law Reform: One Step Forward
and Two Steps Back, 34 INDUS. REL. J. OF ECON. & SOC'Y 382, 385
(1995); see also Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and
Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to
the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (1988).
257. See id. This "ideal" view of the external labor market is realized
only under a very specific set of assumptions (e.g., perfect information,
worker mobility, profit maximization). Where these conditions are not met
market distortions can arise. See DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND POLICY 25-28 (1992).
258. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 256, at 1358-64 (distinguishing
between firm-specific skills, not easily transferable to other firms, and
general skills that are easily transferable across firms within the same
industry). See also GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS - WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 29-
31 (1964) (arguing that different skills require different types of training,
including schooling and job-specific training).
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expense and thus requiring training from the particular firm,
are equally valuable to any other firm searching the same type
of knowledge. 9 Second, that there is no expectation of long-
term employment.26° That is, ELM assumes that both parties
to employment contracts within the ELM can terminate the
contractual relationship without incurring any substantial
loss. 261
Not all employment transactions, however, assume this
form. Some jobs require the employee to learn skills specific to
the particular contracting firm."2 Firm specific tasks may
arise due to the following circumstances:
(1) equipment idiosyncrasies, due to incompletely standard-
ized, albeit common, equipment, the unique characteristics of
which become known through experience; (2) process idio-
syncrasies, which are fashioned or "adopted" by the worker
and his associated in specific operating contexts; (3) informal
team accommodations, attributable to mutual adaptation
among parties engaged in recurrent contact but which are
upset, to the possible detriment of group performance, when
the membership is altered; and (4) communication idiosyncra-
sies with respect to information channels and codes that are
of value only within the firm.2'
Such "specific skills" are valuable only to the particular firm,
and thus, there are no incentives to acquire them within the
ELM context.26' Employees will be reluctant to invest in
skills valuable only to a particular employer in the absence of
some expectation of long term employment. 25 Employers will
259. See id.
260. See Wachter, supra note 256, at 385.
261. See id.
262. See Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV.
353, 366-67 (1984). When describing the relationship between internal
labor markets and specific jobs skills, Leslie writes that "the key premise
of the relational contract model of labor markets is that many job skills
are learned on the job and are specific to the firm. Employees work in
teams, and tasks are complex." Id. (emphasis added).
263. Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter & Jeffrey E. Harris,
Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic
Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 256-57 (1975) (emphasis added).
264. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 256, at 1358.
265. See id.
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be equally reluctant to provide specialized training, since there
is no guarantee that employees will stay with the firm or will
perform in a manner allowing the employer to recover the
costs associated with the training.266 The need arises, there-
fore, to devise a mechanism to create the right kind of incen-
tives for the acquisition of firm specific skills.6 7
Internal Labor Markets ("ILM") provide such a mechanism
and thus constitute an alternative to exclusive reliance on
ELMs.2"' ILMs arise due to the ELMs' inability to deal with
employment transactions when there is a need for firm specific
skills.269 A "perfect" or "ideal" ILM arrangement involves a
detailed and complex employment contract establishing, inter
alia, long term wages and conditions, including employee du-
ties during the contractual period, and the conditions for termi-
nation of the employment relationship.270 Such a "perfect" ar-
rangement is, however, an unattainable ideal.
More likely the parties will act in accordance with an "im-
plicit relational contract," wherein hiring occurs mainly for
entry-level positions, there are promotion ladders, wages at-
tach to particular jobs, and seniority rules may control promo-
tion. 71 In short, the employment relationship is internalized.
Firms potentially can encourage workers to make long-term
investments in the firm, in turn producing technological and
cost efficiencies, by internalizing parts of the employment rela-
tionship.272 Internalization requires certain types of invest-
ment of human capital.2 73 Employees invest early in their ca-
reers, by agreeing to a below market wage rate while learning
266. See id.
267. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking
Glass: Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceil-
ing?, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1517, 1521-24 (1995) (discussing the development
of internal labor markets and their application to employment discrimina-
tion problems).
268. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 256, at 1358 (asserting that
ILMs arise because of the costs of job or company specific skills); see also
Wachter, supra note 256, at 385-86.
269. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 256, at 1358-64.
270. See LESLIE, supra note 257, at 32.
271. See id. at 33.
272. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 256, at 1360-61.
273. See Wachter, supra note 256, at 385.
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the skills required to perform a job-the employee's opportuni-
ty wage.274 Employees recover a return on their investment
at a later point in their careers-when their actual or inside
wage is higher than their opportunity or outside wage.275
Similarly, employers invest at the earlier stages of the
employee's career by paying a wage that is higher than that
employee's marginal productivity."6 The employer recovers
her investment during the employee's midcareer years.277 At
that stage the employee's marginal productivity is believed to
exceed the wage paid by the employer."
The expectation that employees will be attached to the firm
for a long period of time or that they will be adequately com-
pensated for their investments in the case of a breach is cen-
tral to the ILM .1 9 The employer arguably would not want to
274. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just
Cause And Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 12-19 (1993). Pro-
fessor Schwab provides an excellent analysis of the Internal Labor Mar-
kets concept from two different perspectives: the "specific human capital"
story and the "efficiency wage" story. The "specific human capital" story
assumes that investments in firm specific skills occur under an incentive
system where both parties share the cost and benefits over the
employee's work life. See id. at 13-14. Schwab notes that a critical aspect
of the "specific human capital" story is the self-enforcing nature of the
employment relationship. See id. at 15. The "specific human capital" story
assumes that at later stages in the employment relationship both the
employee's productivity is higher than the employee's inside wage, and
the employee's inside wage is higher than the employee's opportunity
wage. See id. Consequently, there is no incentive by either party to ter-
minate the employment relationship. See id. Employees have no incentive
to leave the firm, since they are being paid above what they, could make
in the outside market, and employers have no incentive to fire the em-
ployees, since their productivity exceeds their wages. See id. Under the
"efficiency-wage" story, while employees' productivity later in their careers
is higher than their outside or opportunity wage, their inside wage, is
even higher. See id. at 16. Consequently, the employer has an incentive
to terminate late-career employees, since their wages exceed their produc-
tivity. See id. This Article's description of the development of Internal
Labor Markets is consistent with Professor Schwab's "efficiency-wage"
story.
275. See id. at 18; see also Wachter & Cohen, supra note 256, at 1363.
276. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 256, at 1361.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See Paetzold & Gely, supra note 267, at 1522.
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lose an employee with specialized training because that would
require the training of a substitute and result in a correspond-
ing loss in productivity during the training period.' ° The em-
ployee, on the other hand, will possess skills that are not
readily transferable and will therefore be reluctant to leave the
employment until she has recovered on her investment. 1
Thus, to the extent that the parties to an ILM arrangement
continue their relationship, their agreement will be fully real-
ized.2"2
ILMs thus appear to suggest a solution to the problem of the
acquisition of specific skills caused by the discrete nature of
transactions in the ELM. The ILMs' saving grace, however, is
also a flaw: ILMs may themselves be inefficient due to the
investments' highly specific nature.' Specific skills are in a
sense sunk investments.2"4 Once these investments have been
made, a bilateral-monopoly bargaining arrangement is created
and is ripe for strategic or opportunistic behavior.2"5 "Oppor-
tunistic" behavior occurs when one party attempts to breach
the ILM arrangement by trying to "expropriate" the returns
the other party expects from its investments.286 The
employer's incentive to comply with an implicit contract are
significantly reduced once the employer has recouped her in-
vestmentY7 Thus, if the employer terminates the employ-
ment relationship after the employees have learned the firm-
specific skill and the employer has recovered its investment,
but before the employees are able to recover their investments,
the employees' investments are lost.288  Similarly, an
280. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 256, at 1361.
281. See id. at 1363.
282. See Paetzold & Gely, supra note 267, at 1523.
283. See Wachter, supra note 256, at 385; see also George M. Cohen &
Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The Law and Economics
Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43D ANNUAL NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990) (applying the
internal labor model to the issue of replacement workers under the
NLRA).
284. See Wachter, supra note 256, at 385-86.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 256, at 1361-64.
288. See id.
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employer's investment may be lost if, during the midcareer
years, employees make it more difficult to recover the invest-
ment, by engaging in behavior such as shirking, withholding
information or otherwise increasing monitoring costs. 9
Collective bargaining agreements provide a solution to the
ILM enforcement problem." Collective bargaining agree-
ments attempt to control opportunistic behavior by explicitly
incorporating various aspects of the employment relationship
(i.e., rules governing working hours, promotion opportunities
and grievance procedures) with enforcement mechanisms and
provisions making the agreement contingent on such future
events as changes in the firm's product market or the economy
at large."
Labor law should help create a structure that reduces the
incentives to the parties subject to ILM arrangements to be-
have opportunistically.292 This Article asks whether the cur-
rent interpretation of section 8(a)(2), the TEAM Act, or per-
haps an alternative legal structure, is a better policy instru-
ment to limit the occurrence of the type of opportunistic behav-
289. See id.
290. See Cohen & Wachter, supra note 283, at 115-16; see also Michael
L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Mar-
kets, in THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 86-102
(Daniel J.B. Mitchell & Mahmood A. Zaidi eds., 1990) (discussing how
seniority and other sorts of tenure provisions protect workers from the
potential opportunistic behavior of firms that have recouped their invest-
ments and who would be willing to fire older workers).
291. See Wachter & Wright, supra note 290, at 100-02. Human re-
source management policies serve the same purpose in nonunion firms.
See Wachter, supra note 256, at 386. For example, seniority provisions
are not unique to the unionized workplace. In academia, where the vast
majority of faculty lack union representation, tenure provisions are com-
monly used. The use of tenure in academia nicely fits the ILMs' model.
Younger professors may invest time serving on idiosyncratic university
committees and engage in other firm-specific endeavors with the assur-
ance that once tenured, the university cannot fire them at a later stage
when they are less professionally active. See generally RICHARD P. CHAIT
& ANDREW T. FORD, BEYOND TRADITIONAL TENURE (1982) (examining the
changes taking place in the traditional concept of tenure); BARDWELL L.
SMITH, THE TENURE DEBATE (1973) (explaining the different perspectives
of the tenure debate).
292. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 256, at 1364-67.
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ior described above.
V. ILMS AND WORKPLACE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
A. Overview
The ILM theory provides a powerful tool for understanding
the economic dynamics of workplace cooperative efforts as well
as some guidance as to the appropriate legal standard applica-
ble to cooperative programs under the NLRA. In this section,
the ILM model is used to analyze workplace cooperative ef-
forts. This process requires us to answer three questions: (1)
How do the parties invest within the context of workplace
cooperative efforts? (2) What benefits do the employer and the
employee expect to obtain from the investments made through
participation in the cooperative programs? and (3) What is
likely to go wrong? How can opportunistic behavior occur with-
in the context of workplace cooperative efforts? The next three
sections address these issues.
B. Investments Made...
ILMs are closely related to the acquisition of firm-specific
skills. Their acquisition requires that investments be made by
both employer and employee. Workplace cooperative efforts are
a clear example of an employment arrangement designed to
motivate employees to acquire and develop new skills. Both
employers and employees must invest to establish participato-
ry programs.
As explained in Section II of this Article,29 a central char-
acteristic of all participatory programs is that they require em-
ployees to learn skills, that is make human capital invest-
ments not likely to be transferable to other organizations.'
293. See supra notes 19-85 and accompanying text.
294. Consider, for example, Member Devaney's concurring opinion in
E.I. du Pont, recognizing the ILM characteristics of workplace cooperative
efforts:
Further, the success of many types of employee involvement pro-
grams depends on persuading employees-or freeing them-to turn
their full attention and intelligence to the solution of management
problems; to forget, in a sense, for the duration of the committee's
work that they have their own separate interests in the workplace
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The two types of cooperative efforts discussed above clearly
illustrate the intense investment required of employees after
the program is created.29 Employees involved in Quality Cir-
cles must learn new skills (both interpersonal and technical),
work in assignments outside their groups, and, in general,
immerse themselves in problem-solving techniques unique to
their particular employment. Similarly, the "teams" concept
requires individuals to commit themselves to the goals, objec-
tives, and decision-making processes of the particular group.
This process, though performance-enhancing to a particular
firm, is unlikely to be of great value to the outside market.
Even the less formal programs such as grievance commit-
tees, 296 committees structured around specific workplace
problems such as absenteeism or smoking policies,297 and dis-
cussion groups" require employees to establish a network,
make decisions, and invest personal capital in issues that may
very well be idiosyncratic to their workplace.
The nature of the investments made by employees is proba-
bly best illustrated by the fact that the establishment of
workplace cooperative efforts is not accompanied by additional
immediate compensation. The programs are normally framed
in terms of voluntary participation and employees receive no
extra pay for participation.
Employers also invest when establishing participatory pro-
grams. There are, for example, administrative costs associated
with creating and running such programs.2 9 In addition,
there are costs in the form of initial productivity losses. These
losses result from the time spent by employees learning new
and to do the employer's work.
E.I. du Pont & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 902 (1993) (Devaney, Member,
concurring) (emphasis added).
295. See supra notes 19-85 and accompanying text
296. See, e.g., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110
(1995); General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1233 (1977).
297. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35
F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
298. See, eg., Research Fed. Credit Union, 310 N.L.R.B. 56 (1993).
299. For example, consultants are frequently hired, supervisors' respon-
sibilities are shifted to accommodate the new time commitments, and
administrative support may be required. See CROCKER ET AL., supra note
53, at 67-84.
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tasks, and from the time required for changes in employment
practices to be understood and properly implemented. °°
C. Benefits Expected...
Having identified the investments made by employers and
employees in the context of workplace cooperative efforts, the
next question is why the parties make these substantial in-
vestments. What benefits do both parties expect in return for
their willingness to enter into these implicit contracts?
Generally, employers have strong incentives to invest in the
creation of internal labor markets in the form of workplace
cooperative efforts.30 ' The expected benefits or "returns" from
such investments consist of direct economic benefits and non-
pecuniary or indirect economic benefits.3 2 The former, direct
economic benefits, are easily described. Employers implement-
ing workplace cooperative efforts expect to observe improve-
ments in plant efficiency and productivity. Typically, these
improvements are the result of improved job attitudes and
performance, reduced waste, and increased flexibility in utiliz-
ing the workforce. 03
In addition to direct economic benefits, employers can also
derive nonpecuniary benefits from workplace cooperative ef-
forts. Internal labor markets, in general, and workplace cooper-
ative efforts, in particular, have been described as mechanisms
for limiting and controlling the interclass conflict between
labor and management.0 4 Participatory programs are be-
lieved to help management maintain control over employees by
creating the impression that a democratic workplace exists
without the "assistance" of outside organizations, such as inde-
300. See id.
301. See LAWRENCE T. PINFIELD, THE OPERATION OF INTERNAL LABOR
MARKETS: STAFFING PRACTICES AND VACANCY CHAINS 13-16 (1995) (de-
scribing the origins and functions of ILMs).
302. See RANDALL HANSON ET AL., Employee Empowerment at Risk:
Effects of Recent NLRB Rulings, 9 THE ACAD. OF MGMT. EXECUTIVE 45,
47 (1995) (describing the benefits of implementing workplace cooperative
efforts). But see GRENIER, supra note 7, at 6-13 (questioning whether
quality circles have achieved their expected results).
303. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 73, at 438.
304. See PINFIELD, supra note 301, at 16.
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pendent labor unions. °5 Control can be achieved through co-
optation (making workers adopt management's viewpoint) or
through limiting employee participation to trivial and mean-
ingless aspects of the job.0 6 Workplace cooperative efforts are
particularly suited to these nonpecuniary objectives because of
the intrinsic characteristics of participatory programs. 3' For
example, most participatory programs are couched in a "hu-
manizing" tone, which contrast sharply with typical work bu-
reaucracy. Work rules promulgated by such a source are per-
ceived to be less formal and are created by the employees
themselves rather than imposed by management.
Conversely, as suggested by the ILM rationale, employees
are also willing to make the type of investments required by
workplace cooperative efforts. Employees, like employers, can
expect both pecuniary and nonpecuniary future benefits. Em-
ployees investing in firm-specific skills expect to be monetarily
compensated for their investment; typically ILMs involve high-
er post-training wages where wages are a function of the
employee's tenure.3 0 ' Employees therefore will likely expect
their pay to increase in the post-training period as they ac-
quire increased knowledge about different aspects of the pro-
duction process and as their decision-making responsibilities
increase.0 9
In addition, and particularly true given the kind of invest-
ments expected from employees in this context, employees
participating in cooperative programs expect a return in the
form of increased "voice" in their employment relationship.
"Voice" refers to the use of direct communication to bring actu-
al and desired conditions closer together.310 In the employ-
ment setting, voice is exercised by discussing work conditions
and the need for change rather than quitting the job.11
The most recent survey data indicates that a substantial
305. See GRENIER, supra note 7, at 13-20.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See Schwab, supra note 274, at 15.
309. See NORTHCRAFT & NEALE, supra note 61, at 507-08.
310. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT. Do UNIONS
Do? 7-11 (1984).
311. See id. at 8.
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majority of U.S. workers want the opportunity to participate in
decisions affecting their jobs, the organization of their jobs and
their economic future.312 These same surveys also indicate
that employees value highly the freedom to decide how to do
their work and evidence that their employers appreciate and
act on their suggestions to improve the workplace.313 Employ-
ees involved in workplace cooperative efforts probably have the
expectation that, by participating in these programs, a new
form of work organization providing a continuing voice in the
workplace will be developed. To the extent that knowledge
about the workplace increases with tenure, employees expect
that, like wage rates, "voice" will also become a function of
tenure.
D. What Can Go Wrong...
Finally, the application of the ILM model to the workplace
cooperative effort problem requires a discussion of opportunis-
tic or strategic behavior. What prevents the full realization of
the implicit contracts entered into by employers and employees
within internal labor markets?
ILM arrangements, as discussed above,3" while addressing
some of the inefficiencies of the external labor market, also
create several problems of their own. In particular, ILMs are
likely to result in "opportunistic" behavior." 5 Opportunistic
behavior appears when one party attempts to breach the ILM
arrangement by trying to "expropriate" the other party's ex-
pected return on its investments.31 Parties to an ILM con-
tract cannot easily leave the relationship without substantially
losing the value of their investment.1 7 Once the employer
has recovered her investment, her incentives to comply with
the implicit contract are significantly reduced.3 8 Similarly,
the employer's investment could be lost if, during the mid-
312. See Fact Finding Report, supra note 1, at 30-31 (discussing survey
results on employees' attitudes toward participation).
313. See id.
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career years, employees make it more difficult for their em-
ployer to recover her investments by engaging in behavior such
as shirking, withholding information or increasing monitoring
costs. 19
As in the case of other ILM arrangements, opportunistic
behavior within the workplace cooperative effort context ap-
pears at post-training stages in the employment relationship.
The opportunity to "cheat" arises only after the parties have
invested in training or other firm-specific acquisitions. In most
ILM arrangements, both parties have similar opportunities to
engage in strategic behavior. What distinguishes the workplace
cooperative efforts context is that, while the employer retains
the ability to behave opportunistically, the structure of partici-
patory programs leaves the employees in a rather vulnerable
position.
1. "Cheating" Later On
The ILM predicts that once the long-term investments have
been made, in theory, both employers and employees have the
ability to engage in opportunistic or strategic behavior.32
Employees can reduce their job efforts, while employers can
terminate the employment contract or make unilateral changes
in employment conditions. This section examines how the op-
portunities to engage in opportunistic behavior arise within the
context of workplace cooperative efforts.
Employer opportunistic behavior in the workplace coopera-
tive efforts context can occur in either or both of the following
ways: 1) terminating the employees that have participated in
the program; 2) terminating the program itself. Consider first
the employer's option to terminate the employees that have
been involved in a program. Since, under current law,3 21 most
nonunionized employees can be terminated at will, there are
few constraints on the employer not to terminate employees
319. See id.
320. See supra notes 268-318 and accompanying text.
321. See Schwab, supra note 274, at 28-30. To the extent that courts,
as Schwab argues, recognize and apply the ILM principle to employment-
at-will decisions, the constraint described in the text will be much more
burdensome. See id. at 32-51.
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after their peak productivity years. An employer that has es-
tablished a workplace cooperative effort with the expectation of
increased productivity will probably wait to see if the program
is successful. If the program is successful, that is, if there are
observable increases in productivity, the employer will, at that
time, recover whatever investments she has made in the pro-
gram. The employer can continue the program for as long as
productivity of those employees involved in the program ex-
ceeds their inside wage. As suggested by the ILM model, how-
ever, at some point, the inside wage will exceed the employees'
productivity. At that time, the employer can terminate the
employees. If the cooperative effort proves unsuccessful, there
would be an even greater incentive for the employer to imme-
diately terminate the employees involved in the program. Simi-
lar incentives exist in situations where the participatory pro-
gram may have been used as an anti-union device.
The employer's decision to terminate the employees involved
in the participatory program might arguably be constrained by
reputational considerations. When an employer
"opportunistically" terminates a group of employees, the em-
ployer is abrogating an implied contract with these employees.
The repeated breach of such implied contracts will result in
the employer acquiring a negative reputation. Future employ-
ees will be reluctant to enter into similar contracts, or will only
do so at a substantial premium - thus defeating the purpose of
the internal labor market's arrangement. Reputation, then, is
supposed to serve as a check or "monitor" on employer behav-
ior.
Some ILM scholars have argued that reputation costs are,
on average, large enough to deter opportunistic behavior on the
part of the employer. 22 The extent to which reputation
serves as a constraint on opportunistic behavior, however, is
highly questionable.3" The inter-firm transfer of reputational
information between generations of workers (i.e., employees
who have been fired telling new employees about the
322. See Cohen & Wachter, supra note 283, at 118.
323. See Schwab, supra note 274, at 26-28; see also Leonard Bierman
& Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics, and Negotiations
Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 374-78 (1995) (rejecting the argument
that reputation is an absolute constraint on opportunistic behavior).
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employer's reputation), is most often incomplete and conse-
quently unlikely to be a substantial constraint on opportunistic
firings. 24 In addition, reputation will not constrain an em-
ployer who does not expect to use participatory programs in
the future. For example, suppose an employer seeks informa-
tion from the employees concerning an aspect of the production
process that needs improvement. The employer introduces a
participatory program and obtains the information. The
employer's goal has been achieved and the program is a suc-
cess. Having obtained the information, however, the employer
may very well disband the program and continue operations in
a traditional, less participatory manner.
In addition to terminating employees, the employer may, at
any time, terminate the participatory program without consult-
ing the employees involved in the effort. Unlike situations
involving board-certified bargaining representatives, the em-
ployer is not required to consult with the employees involved
in the workplace cooperative effort before terminating the
program."a Thus, the employer could potentially implement
the program, recover her investment and then terminate the
program.
As when an employer opportunistically terminates employ-
ees, the employer's decision to terminate a participatory pro-
gram arguably may be constrained by reputational consider-
ations. The case for a reputational constraint is somewhat
stronger in the case of intra-firm reputation transfers, employ-
ees discussing their experiences and the employer's reputation
with other employees of the same firm, than with inter-firm
transfers. Still, reputation does not constitute a significant
constraint within the context of workplace cooperative efforts.
The reason is twofold. First, employees do not usually have a
real choice about whether or not to establish a participatory
program. Although participation in these programs is usually
described by employers as voluntary, there are strong pres-
sures, both formal and informal, on employees to "join" the
324. See Schwab, supra note 274, at 27.
325. Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA impose on both the em-
ployer and the union a duty to bargain in good faith with respect to
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1994).
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group effort. Thus, while employees may be well aware of the
likelihood of the employer "cheating" by opportunistically ter-
minating the program, they may perceive no alternative but to
participate in the cooperative effort. Second, even in cases of
intra-firm reputation transfers, the employer has an extraor-
dinary opportunity to misinform employees and reconstruct
past events in a light favorable to the organization. Employees
newly involved in the program may be convinced that the new
effort will be more successful than the previous attempt to
establish a participatory program and that the problem lay not
with the employer, but was instead caused by a "disgruntled"
group of employees.32
There are several reasons why an employer may choose to
terminate a participatory program. There are straightforward
cases where the benefits currently derived from the participa-
tory program are smaller than the costs associated with its
continuation. There are, however, less obvious reasons for an
employer to terminate these programs. The program may have
been established to divert attention from more significant or
underlying problems. The goal having been achieved, the em-
ployer may then terminate the participatory program.327 Al-
ternatively, the employer may have sought specific information
from employees that would otherwise be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to obtain. For example, information on the reasons for
high absenteeism, high employee turnover or problematic su-
pervisors is easily accessible to employees but may not normal-
ly be shared with management. An employer may establish a
participatory program to obtain such information, without any
real commitment to allowing employees to recover the benefits
associated with participation in cooperative efforts.
Theoretically, employers can engage in opportunistic behav-
ior within the workplace cooperative effort context, whether by
326. See generally GRENIER, supra note 7, at 116-25 (describing how a
social psychologist at a plant which was undergoing an organization drive
manipulated employees into changing positions they had taken publicly in
support of the union).
327. An extreme example and an unfortunately common occurrence is
the case where an employer seeks to dilute union support during an
organizing campaign. For an excellent case study describing how a com-
pany implemented this strategy, see GRENIER, supra note 7.
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terminating the program or terminating the employees in-
volved in the program. There appears to be very little incentive
within the ILM context to prevent such behavior.
In theory, employees possess a similar ability to behave
opportunistically within the ILM context. Workplace coopera-
tive efforts, however, present an unusual set of circumstances
which in practice prevent opportunistic behavior by employees.
As in all ILM arrangements, employees can behave
opportunistically by reducing their work effort - an activity
known as "shirking." Shirking can take various forms. Employ-
ees can, for example, "dally" or engage in pranks while at
work." Shirking can also take the form of not thinking cre-
atively, thereby failing to actively contribute to the firm's effi-
ciency and productivity.329
Employees, however, face a constraint on opportunistic be-
havior that substantially reduces their ability to shirk: the
nature and structure of the workplace cooperative effort it-
self."° As discussed in Section II, a key feature of workplace
cooperative efforts is that they require employees to work in
groups.33' Two aspects of group dynamics serve as significant
constraints on employee opportunistic behavior: the way per-
formance is measured and peer pressure.
Teams and other workplace cooperative efforts are normally
evaluated on the basis of group rather than individual perfor-
mance. The goals and objectives are group-driven, not individ-
ually developed. In order for any individual in the group to do
well, the "whole" must do well. By the same token, improper
performance by a group member affects not only the individu-
al, but the group as well. In this sense, shirking by the individ-
ual results in externalities for other group members. 2 This
incentive structure, emphasizing group performance, creates
328. See Schwab, supra note 274, at 21-24.
329. See id.
330. In addition to the constraint imposed by the structure of participa-
tory programs themselves, employees also face a reputation constraint. As
in the case of employers, however, reputation is unlikely to substantially
control opportunistic behavior. See id. at 23.
331. See supra notes 19-85 and accompanying text.
332. See NORTHCRAFT & NEALE, supra note 61, at 278-307 (discussing
the characteristics of group influences on individual behavior).
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incentives for employees to monitor themselves. 33 Peer pres-
sure becomes a control mechanism that the employer can use
to monitor and control employee shirking.34 Workplace coop-
erative efforts, as a managerial ethic, are therefore no more
than a refined bureaucracy. 33 Their intent is simply to direct
employees into more efficient modes of operation by means of
employee self-monitoring through peer pressure.
Finally, even if employees were able to shirk, it is not clear
that such behavior is costly to the employer. Employee shirk-
ing is of little consequence to an employer who instituted the
cooperative program as a means of distracting employees from
more urgent and substantive employee concerns. Such would
be the case where the employer established the participatory
program in response to an independent union's organizing
drive.
In conclusion, employers risk little by engaging in workplace
cooperative efforts. Such enterprises require employee invest-
ment in firm-specific skills. Once the skills have been acquired,
the likelihood of employees engaging in opportunistic behavior
is reduced by the nature of the cooperative effort itself. In
addition, employers are unfettered in their ability to behave
opportunistically once the investments have been made by
employees. Given that the cooperative effort can be discontin-
ued at any time, and given that employees have little, and
333. See GRENIER, supra note 7, at 17-20, 129-30 (describing peer pres-
sure as the simplest and most effective method of controlling the atti-
tudes and behavior of employees).
334. See id.
335. Grenier concludes that participatory programs involve a "de-bu-
reaucratizing" control mechanism of greater sophistication, efficiency and
subtlety than traditional bureaucratic techniques. See id. at 131. Grenier
notes that participatory programs, as a "de-bureaucratizing" mechanism,
possess the following characteristics: an increased personalization of au-
thority; decreased dependence on "rules" imposed by management; the
separation of decisionmaking from the power to implement decisions; the
institutionalization of peer pressure as a control mechanism; and an
increased use of managerial rhetoric to de-emphasize power differences
and emphasize a common purpose. See id.; see also Thomas C. Kohler,
The Overlooked Middle, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229, 245 (1993) (arguing
that under workplace cooperative schemes, individuals exist only through
the group, with no separate identity of their own).
336. See GRENIER, supra note 7, at 131.
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most likely, no opportunity to refuse to participate, employers
can establish the program, reap the benefits and then discon-
tinue the program.
2. "Cheating" Early On
The application of the ILM analysis to the workplace cooper-
ative efforts context indicates a disturbing conclusion. They
facilitate employer opportunistic behavior, and such behavior is
more likely to occur at later stages in the employment relation-
ship. From an ILM perspective, the real problem with coopera-
tive efforts is that they provide the employer with additional
opportunities to behave opportunistically by expropriating
rents due to employees who have made idiosyncratic invest-
ments with the particular employer. The focus of section
8(a)(2), therefore, should be to prevent such opportunistic be-
havior.
As demonstrated by the cases reviewed in Section III(C) of
this Article, 7 the Board and reviewing courts have not con-
sidered the important insights available through the ILM anal-
ysis. Although at times the Board and several courts of appeal
have alluded to elements consistent with the ILM analysis,"
the determination of the legal status of workplace cooperative
efforts has commonly focused on other issues, specifically, the
effect the participatory program could have on the ability of
employees to freely choose their bargaining representative.
For example, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits and certain Board
decisions. 9 developing the Free Choice paradigm articulate
the view that the central inquiry when evaluating a workplace
cooperative effort pursuant to section 8(a)(2) is whether
employees' freedom to choose their preferred form of represen-
tation has been detrimentally affected."' Thus, when decid-
337. See supra notes 144-223 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 997-98 (1992) (in-
quiring whether program's existence depended on employer fiat), enforced,
35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
339. See supra notes 124-143 and accompanying text.
340. Labor unions have expressed similar concerns. See Fact Finding
Report, supra note 1, at 32-34. For example, opponents of the proposed
changes to § 8(a)(2) have expressed their concern that interference with
participatory programs may impede the ability of unions to organize new
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ing charges brought under section 8(a)(2), courts applying the
Free Choice paradigm have focused on the issue of "actual" as
opposed to "potential" domination, and have analyzed the dom-
ination issue from the "subjective" view of employees. 34' The
Board, when finding various forms of cooperative efforts to be
illegal, has adopted a similar rationale. For example, in his
Electromation concurrence, Member Devaney discussed at
length his view that a workplace cooperative effort cannot be a
labor organization in the absence of the "representation" ele-
ment. 2 Absent this factor, argued Devaney, there is no
harm to the employees' right to choose their own bargaining
representative.14  A similar argument was advanced by
Chairman Gould in Keeler Brass.4 The Board, citing with
approval the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chicago Raw-
hide, 5 required the employees' subjective view to be consid-
ered when determining domination.346
The focus on freedom of choice, as opposed to the opportunis-
tic behavior, may in part be due to the timing of events in
cases raising section 8(a)(2) complaints. A review of the cases
discussed above indicates that challenges to participatory pro-
grams tend to be raised in conjunction with a union organizing
drive.347 This is to be expected since, without the involvement
workers. See id. Labor organizations long have been concerned by
employers' use of cooperative efforts as a union avoidance technique. See
id. There is ample evidence that union avoidance has been one of the
motivating factors, although not the only one, behind management efforts
to implement workplace cooperative efforts. See id. By providing employ-
ees with a sense of "ownership" over the workplace, the satisfaction of
being able to influence their work product, and an apparent voice in
workplace issues, employers expect employees' perception of the need for
collective outside representation to be diminished. See id.
341. See id.
342. See Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1002-03.
343. See id.
344. 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1116-19 (1995).
345. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
346. Chairman Gould has, in later writings, qualified this statement by
adding that, although employees' subjective views are important, "[t]o rely
completely upon employee satisfaction would undermine extant Supreme
Court precedent." (footnotes omitted). See Gould's Address, supra note
191.
347. Ten of the twelve cases decided by the Board since the
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of an independent union, employees may be hesitant or even
unaware of their right to challenge the legality of the coopera-
tive effort. The consequence of when the claims are raised on
section 8(a)(2) analysis is a distortion of both legal analysis
and issues. Because of the immediate impact a participatory
program may have on employees' ability to organize collective-
ly, an issue that is in itself worthy of section 8(a)(2) analysis
has been permeated with representational rights rhetoric.
While laudable, the focus on representational and free choice
issues has led the Board and reviewing courts to overlook more
significant problems raised by workplace cooperative efforts.
Preventing opportunistic behavior at later stages of the
employment relationship should be the guiding principle when
evaluating the legality of cooperative efforts. The Board and
the courts should focus, not on their immediate impact on the
organizing drive, but on the effect the participatory program
could have on the long-term employment relationship. The
central inquiry should be whether the employer's program
increases the likelihood of opportunistic behavior at later stag-
es of the employment process. Issues of freedom of choice
caused by employers using participatory programs as anti-
union mechanisms are better addressed by other provisions of
the Act,348 specifically section 8(a)(1). By relying on section
8(a)(1) to protect employees' representational and free choice
rights, the Board can free section 8(a)(2) for the opportunistic
behavior problem-a problem so far largely ignored in section
8(a)(2) jurisprudence.
An issue commonly litigated under the NLRA concerns the
legality of the employer's granting or withholding of economic
benefits in order to interfere with a union's organizing ef-
fort. 9 The Supreme Court has held that such an action by
Electromation decision involved a complaint raised by a union which had
recently began an organizing drive. The only two cases not involving
union organizing drives are E.I. du Pont and Vons Grocery Co. See supra
notes 144-223 and accompanying text.
348. See infra notes 349-59 and accompanying text. The NLRA is well
equipped to deal with the type of illegality that can occur at the organiz-
ing stage via cooperative efforts.
349. See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 163-68 (1976).
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the employer amounts to a violation of sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3). 30 The Court reasoned that "[e]mployees are not likely
to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred
is also the source from which future benefits must flow and
which may dry up if it is not obliged."351 Whether the benefits
granted are permanent and unconditional is of no import be-
cause a grant of benefits under such conditions will be held to
be an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1). 2
A benefit subject to this standard of review is the solicitation
of employee complaints during a union organizing cam-
paign."' The Board has long held that the solicitation of em-
ployee grievances during an organizational campaign interferes
with an election.354 The Board has found such behavior to
violate section 8(a)(1), even absent an express promise of un-
conditional future benefits or an explicit "no-promise"
pledge. 5 The Board has also been willing to find a section
8(a)(1) violation without any showing of employer anti-union
motive. 6 Although these cases are not directly on point, the
350. See NLRB v. Exchange Parts, Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964). Section
8(a)(1) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994). Section
8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor orga-
nization." § 158(a)(3).
351. Exchange Parts, Co., 375 U.S. at 409.
352. See id. at 410.
353. See generally GORMAN, supra note 349, at 166.
354. See id.
355. See Raley's, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 971, 972 (1978), enforced, 608 F.2d
1374 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the employer violated § 8(a)(1) by con-
ducting a series of meetings preceding a representation election in which
employees voiced their grievances on a variety of subjects). Cf. Clare
Community Hosp., 273 N.L.R.B. 1755, 1755 (1985) (determining that
there is no violation of § 8(a)(1) when the employer creates, preceding a
representation election, a Communications Task Force, the purpose of
which was to improve communication between employees and manage-
ment).
356. Although motive is normally not a factor in § 8(a)(1) cases, the
Supreme Court, in the leading decision in this area, Exchange Parts Co.,
relied on the showing of illegal motive in finding that the employer had
committed an unfair labor practice. See GORMAN, supra note 349, at 165.
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rationale arguably extends to situations where the employer
dismantles a workplace cooperative effort upon learning of the
union's organizing drive.357
The Board's current interpretation of section 8(a)(1) is well
suited to the concerns raised by unions with respect to employ-
ers using workplace cooperative efforts as anti-organizing
weapons. Violations of section 8(a)(2) also raise, by definition, a
derivative 8(a)(1) violation.35 Claims arising from interfer-
ence with the employees' freedom of choice and undue interfer-
ence with the selection of a bargaining representative by the
creation of a workplace cooperative effort can properly be ad-
dressed under current section 8(a)(1) jurisprudence.359
VI. HOW CAN WE FIX IT?
A. The Current Approach
Section 8(a)(2) can be understood as an enforcement mecha-
nism to prevent opportunistic behavior within ILMs." ° Re-
gardless of whether one favors an expansive reading of section
8(a)(2), it is generally understood that for a labor organization
to genuinely represent employees' concerns, the labor organiza-
tion must be as independent as possible.361 A high level of in-
dependence is crucial to minimizing the kind of opportunistic
behavior that can arise within the ILM context." 2 In the
past, the Board and reviewing courts have chosen to focus on
arguably less important matters, instead of the issue of the
independent existence of the labor organization. Recent NLRB
decisions, however, are consistent with the concerns raised in
357. Professors Harper and Estreicher raise this question rhetorically in
their labor law casebook, but without any specific discussion or explana-
tion. See MICHAEL C. HARPER & SAMUEL ESTREICHER, LABOR LAW: CAS-
ES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 395 (1996).
358. See GORMAN, supra note 349, at 132.
359. See Estreicher, supra note 46, at 131 (noting that employer-coer-
cion does not explain the full breadth of § 8(a)(2) because other sections
of the Act directly address the coercive behavior commonly associated
with the installation of employee representation programs).
360. See Wachter, supra note 256, at 385.
361. See Summers, supra note 86, at 141.
362. See id.
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this Article.63
The Board's current approach under Electromation and its
progeny entails a two step analysis. First, when determining
whether a cooperative effort is a labor organization, most cases
appear to turn on the "dealing with" requirement."4 This ele-
ment involves a search for evidence of a "pattern or practice" of
employees making proposals to management and management
responding to those proposals. 3 5 Second, the recent cases in-
dicate that the question of domination turns on whether the
"continued existence" of the cooperative effort was by employerfiat. 366
The focus on "the pattern or practice" and "continued exis-
tence" elements are, in general, consistent with the ILM analy-
sis discussed in this Article. The requirement that, for there to
be a section 8(a)(2) violation, it must be established that the
cooperative effort existed for the purpose of implementing a
pattern or practice of employees making proposals and man-
agement responding to those proposals suggests that the Board
is cognizant of the skill investment aspect of workplace cooper-
ative efforts. Thus, the NLRA should be interpreted to protect
such investments from opportunistic behavior. Although the
Board has focused on a showing of a past "pattern or prac-
tice," 6' the language of E.I. du Pont,' 8 cited with approval
by the Board in later cases allows for a prospective application
of the test.3 69 Under this test, it is sufficient that the program
under review has the potential for generating a "pattern or
practice" even if it has not done so at the time of the Board's
review. 3
70
Similarly, the Board's current focus on the issue of "contin-
ued existence" addresses the key concern of the ILM analysis:
363. See supra notes 191-223 and accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., Stoody Co., Div. of Thermadyne, 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995);
Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995).
365. See id.
366. See, e.g., Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 1154 (1995);
Webcor Packing, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995).
367. See Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. at 20-21; Vons Grocery Co., 320
N.L.R.B. at 54.
368. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
369. See id. at 894.
370. See cases cited supra note 364.
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the employer's ability to discontinue a program after recover-
ing her investment before employees have had an opportunity
to do so. The holding that a committee that can be terminated
at will is clearly dominated by the employer arguably imposes
a new requirement that cooperative efforts may be discontin-
ued only with employee consent or approval. Such a require-
ment would ensure that ILM agreements are not breached
with impunity and would require employers to either fulfill
their implicit ILM commitments or compensate employees for
their breach.37'
The latter element might require further development by the
Board and reviewing courts, especially in light of language
used in E.I. du Pont, and other recent NLRB decisions.372 In
his concurring opinion in E.I. du Pont, Member Devaney noted
that the fact the employer forms the committee and can dis-
solve the committee at will does not in itself amount to a viola-
tion of section 8(a)(2). 73 Also troubling are the concurring
opinions of Member Raudabaugh in Electromation 1 4 and
Chairman Gould in Keeler Brass Automotive.175 Both opinions
discuss the independence issue in their analysis of domination
and interference by focusing on the origins of the workplace
cooperative effort. For example, in Electromation, Member
Raudabaugh argues that the fact that the idea for a participa-
tory program began with the employer is not sufficient to con-
demn it.378 Chairman Gould makes a similar argument in
Keeler Brass.77 He notes that cooperative efforts in the
workplace have generally been initiated by employers.378 Con-
sequently, cooperative efforts are not unlawful simply because
the employer initiated them.379 Missing from these two con-
curring opinions, however, is any mention of the "continued
371. For a discussion of the enforceability of implicit contracts in this
context, see infra notes 372-79 and accompanying text.
372. See cases cited supra note 364.
373. E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 902 (1993).
374. 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1013 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.
1994).
375. 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1119 (1995).
376. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1013.
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existence" element, a factor crucial to the Board's majority in
the Electromation decision.
The extent to which the language in these three concurring
opinions may become the prevailing interpretation of the "con-
tinued existence" element is unclear. Arguably, the statements
are consistent with the Board's Electromation decision. That is,
in addition to considering whether the "continued existence" of
the program is within the employer's discretion, the Board can
also consider how the committee was created and how indepen-
dent the committee's decisionmaking process really is. So long
as the Board requires the committee's "continued existence" to
be independent of the employer, the additional two factors do
not affect the ILM analysis. The two factors might even serve
as evidence of the "continued existence" element. The ILM
analysis suggests that no factor is more important to discover-
ing the possibility of opportunistic behavior than the "contin-
ued existence" element.
In short, the current approach is potentially well suited to
addressing the problem of opportunistic behavior.
Electromation, E.L du Pont, and their progeny suggest an
analysis applicable to the problems identified in the ILM anal-
ysis. There is, however, language in these same decisions sug-
gesting the Board may not have the resolve to deal squarely
with the opportunistic behavior problem.
B. Would the TEAM Act deter opportunistic behavior?
Under the current Board interpretation of sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2), it is arguably possible with some minor clarifications to
deter the opportunistic behavior that can follow the introduc-
tion of workplace cooperative efforts. Conversely, it is clear
that legislation such as that proposed in the TEAM Act would
not prevent such strategic behavior, and may in fact motivate
such behavior.
The TEAM Act was ultimately vetoed.8 An analysis of the
potential ramifications of such legislation, however, remains
relevant as the issue is very much alive. The proposed bill
380. See Employee Participation: Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite
Pleas from Business for Passage, supra note 4, at d4 (reporting President
Clinton's veto of TEAM Act).
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would have allowed workplace cooperative efforts to address
"[miatters of mutual interest, including issues of quality, pro-
ductivity and efficiency .... , "1 Discussion of a broad range
of issues would likely have required employees to acquire skills
particular to the contracting organization. The sanction of
discussion of a wide range of topics would have encouraged
employers to experiment with cooperative efforts and led to a
corresponding employee investment in the required skills.
Such an outcome is, arguably, desirable. To the extent that
employer experimentation leads to greater employee involve-
ment, workplace democracy, increases in productivity and the
acquisition of new skills by employees; it benefits workers,
management and society at large. The problem lay, however,
in an aspect the drafters of the TEAM Act overlooked com-
pletely.
The legislation would have made tremendous concessions to
employers by excluding workplace cooperative efforts as evi-
dence of an unfair labor practice. There was, however, no men-
tion of a corresponding obligation on employers to satisfy the
expectations inherent in a ILM implied contract after the coop-
erative effort was implemented. Employers, under the proposed
TEAM Act could have established cooperative efforts, locked
employees into long term investments in firm-specific skills,
collected any resulting benefits, and then terminated the pro-
gram without permitting employees to recover on their invest-
ments. In fact, as drafted, the proposed bill would have encour-
aged such behavior. As discussed in Section III.D above,32
the TEAM Act would have specifically foreclosed employers
from negotiating or entering into a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the employees participating in a cooperative pro-
gram.13 This last section was justified by the bills' propo-
nents as a means of ensuring that workplace cooperative ef-
forts would not become a substitute for collective bargain-
ing.384 The effect of such language, however, would have been
cooperative efforts precluding employees from entering legally
enforceable contracts and any ability to protect themselves
381. See H.R. 743, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995).
382. See supra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
383. See H.R. 743 § 3.
384. See Gunderson's Statement, supra note 226.
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against opportunistic behavior by the employer.'
C. A Modest Proposal
This Article has sketched the contours of a potential solution
suggested by the ILM model to the problems raised by the
current interpretations of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2). This section
will briefly summarize my proposed solution.
1. The Section 2(5) Question
The definition of a "labor organization" under section 2(5)
turns on the Board's language in E.I. du Pont, requiring the
demonstration of either a "pattern or practice" of employee
proposals and management response to such proposals, or
"that the group exists for a purpose of such a pattern of prac-
tice." 8 In order to provide the protection needed against em-
ployer opportunistic behavior, the language must be interpret-
ed broadly enough to allow the Board to determine whether
the cooperative effort would likely result in employees merging
themselves into the new procedures enough to make firm spe-
cific investments.
This interpretation of the section 2(5) problem may result in
a finding that cooperative efforts are in fact labor organiza-
tions. To the extent this is true, the proposal is consistent with
Member Raudabaugh's view in Electromation, noting that most
participatory programs will probably satisfy the requirements
of section 2(5)," ' and that a more profitable line of inquiry
would be to focus on the question of domination and interfer-
ence.
385. See Charles J. Morris, Will There be a New Direction for American
Industrial Relations? - A Hard Look at the TEAM Bill, the Sawyer Sub-
stitute Bill and the Employee Involvement Bill, 47 LAB L.J. 89, 90-91
(1996).
386. E.I. Du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
387. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1008-09 (1992), enforced,
35 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
388. See id. at 1008.
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2. The Section 8(a)(2) Question
The Board and reviewing courts must continue to focus their
attention on the independence of the cooperative effort, and
specifically whether the committee's continued existence de-
pends entirely on employer fiat. To the extent that the employ-
er has the power to disband cooperative programs at will, the
program is likely to violate section 8(a)(2). Conversely, if the
employees involved in the cooperative effort have the ability to
oppose or otherwise counter the employer's decision, the inde-
pendence of the labor organizations has been satisfactorily
established under section 8(a)(2). An employer willing to estab-
lish a cooperative program without running afoul of section
8(a)(2) would have only to grant the group the right to oppose
its termination and a means of exercising such right."9
3. The Enforcement Mechanism
Requiring employee approval before program termination
raises the related issue of how such an obligation should be
enforced. It has been suggested that the employer be allowed
to show, as a defense to a section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice
charge, that the workplace cooperative effort satisfies the "con-
tinued existence" requirement.9 °
389. Professor Rogers has advanced a similar proposal, albeit from a
different perspective. He would provide as a defense to section 8(a)(2) an
employer's demonstration that:
(a) the system was authorized by a majority of employees
in a secret ballot; (b) that before the ballot, employees were spe-
cially advised of their right to oppose the creation of such a plan
without reprisal; (c) that such authorization expires in some
uniform period of time, perhaps three years, unless
reauthorized . . . ; (d) that the system may be abolished by a
majority of employees in a secret ballot at any time; and, (e)
that the system cannot at any time be unilaterally abolished by
the employer.
Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97,
114 (1993) (citing the proposals made by Hyde, supra note 86, at 188,
and adding two of his own). Professor Summers would further require
the employer under section 8(a)(2) to show that once established, the
program could be abolished only by the employees. See Summers, supra
note 86, at 142.
390. See Rogers, supra note 389, at 114.
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An alternative approach would make the "implicit agree-
ments" underlying workplace cooperative efforts legally en-
forceable.39' The agreed employment practices, such as rules
and promised benefits form the basis for the workplace cooper-
ative effort and can be understood by reviewing courts as im-
plied contracts worthy of legal enforcement. Where employees
participating in cooperative efforts have made substantial firm-
specific investments, the courts must be willing to carefully
scrutinize employers' decisions to discontinue programs or
terminate employees. If the employees have made firm-specific
investments, such as to substantially perform their side of the
"contract," the appropriate remedy for an employer's breach
may be damages or specific performance perhaps by awarding
the employee reinstatement and back pay.392
Although this proposal appears rather radical, there is plen-
ty of case law supporting the enforceability of explicit or im-
plicit individual and group contracts.393 Professor Schwab's
analysis of leading case law in the employment-at-will area
can be understood to support such "implicit arrangements" and
recognizes the need to guard against opportunistic behav-
ior.394 Furthermore, individual "implicit contracts" are en-
forceable even when there is a recognized labor organiza-
tion.395 For example, employees may enforce individual agree-
ments created when they were not represented by a union, and
even promises made in the presence of a recognized bargaining
agent, so long as such promises were not part of the collective
bargaining agreement.39
This proposal requires the Board to recognize that workplace
391. See Paetzold & Gely, supra note 267, at 1551; see also Summers,
supra note 86, at 145.
392. See Paetzold & Gely, supra note 267, at 1551.
393. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass.
1977) (recognizing a cause of action for breach of implied covenant of
good faith in employment contracts); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,
306 N.W.2d. 114 (Minn. 1981) (allowing employee, who had resigned his
prior job in reliance of job offer and who was told before beginning new
job that position had been filled, to recover under doctrine of promissory
estoppel).
394. See Schwab, supra note 274, at 32-61.
395. See Hyde, supra note 86, at 161.
396. See id.
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cooperative efforts must be viewed from the ILM perspective.
The analysis suggests that the prevention of opportunistic
behavior must be the central focus of section 8(a)(2). Such
issues as freedom of choice and representational matters are
better addressed by other provisions of the Act, specifically
section 8(a)(1). 97
This proposal may arguably be a disincentive to employer
experimentation with workplace cooperative efforts. Similar
criticisms have been levelled at other proposals that sought to
resolve the section 8(a)(2) debate.398 To the extent that em-
ployers establish participatory programs in order to engage in
opportunistic behavior, the statement is probably correct. The
proposal, however, in no way limits employers' ability to estab-
lish such programs, nor reduces their ability to terminate the
programs, provided that the employees involved have been
consulted or compensated for their participation. Employees
claiming a breach of the implicit agreement will have to show
that they have made firm-specific investments and that they
have not been allowed to recover the anticipated returns. As
noted by Professor Schwab courts are capable of such determi-
nations at common law and have done so in other areas of the
employment relationship.399
VII. CONCLUSION
Professor Kohler has suggested in his commentary on the
section 8(a)(2) debate that, despite the large volume of re-
search conducted on the legality of workplace cooperative ef-
forts, some "pretty big things" remain unaddressed. °° One
397. The idea that a change in the Board's interpretation of section
8(a)(2) must be accompanied by changes in other provisions of the Act
has some currency. Professor Samuel Estreicher, for example, argues in
favor of narrowing the definition of a "labor organization" under section
2(5). See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competi-
tive Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 35-46 (1993). Such change, how-
ever, must occur within the context of changes to other sections of the
Act's provisions to ensure that employees' representational rights are not
infringed. See id.
398. See Summers, supra note 86, at 148.
399. See Schwab, supra note 274, at 57.
400. "Humans can ignore anything, G.K. Chesterton observed, as long
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such thing has been the Internal Labor Market characteristics
of workplace cooperative efforts and the insight the character-
istics can bring to our understanding of the problem. This
Article begins to explore some implications of the ILM ap-
proach to workplace cooperative efforts.
The ILM analysis suggests three conclusions. First, the
implementation of workplace cooperative efforts requires the
employees involved to acquire firm-specific skills-skills that
are not easily transferable to other employers.. In this regard,
workplace cooperative efforts represent a form of internal labor
markets. Workplace cooperative efforts can be understood as a
series of implicit or explicit agreements between employer and
employee over the acquisition of some skills in exchange for a
deferred benefit.
Once an ILM is established, both parties are in a position to
engage in strategic or opportunistic behavior. Employers can
terminate the employment relationship, while employees can
engage in unproductive behavior that is difficult for the em-
ployer to detect. Workplace cooperative efforts are, however, a
variant of implicit agreements that permits opportunistic em-
ployer behavior, but structurally reduces the opportunity for
employee opportunistic behavior. The workplace cooperative
effort framework prevents employee shirking, as the group
itself becomes an enforcing mechanism. No countervailing
pressure, however, exists for the employer. Under existing law,
employers can terminate participatory programs without con-
sideration for their employees' firm-specific investments. This
scenario leads us to a second implication.
Workplace cooperative efforts are particularly problematic,
not because they can assume representational forms that "fool"
employees into believing that their interests have been ade-
quately protected, but because of the incentives they create for
employers to behave opportunistically. Any test devised to deal
with the legality of cooperative efforts under sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2) of the NLRA must recognize these dynamics.
Finally, the analysis of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) from an ILM
perspective suggests the following conclusions. The definition
as the thing being ignored is big enough." Kohler, supra note 335, at
229.
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of a labor organization under section 2(5) should be focused on
the "dealing with" element. In particular, in the language of
Board's E.I. du Pont decision, the inquiry should be on whether
there has been a pattern or practice of employee proposals and
management acceptance or rejection of such proposals, or a
showing that the group existed for the purpose of such a pat-
tern or practice. Properly interpreted, this standard allows the
Board to bring within the scope of section 2(5) any cooperative
effort in which firm-specific investments have or will be made.
With respect to the question of domination and interference
under section 8(a)(2), the ILM perspective suggests that the
focus should be on the "continued existence" element. So long
as the workplace cooperative effort's existence depends entirely
on employer fiat, there will be a violation of the Act. Employ-
ers wishing to establish participatory programs conforming
with section 8(a)(2) must provide employees with the power to
oppose the termination of the programs, and the courts must
be willing to enforce the "implicit" contracts resulting from
these employment arrangements and provide relief for employ-
ees confronted by an employer's opportunistic behavior.
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